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Abstract
Following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, tensions between the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and evidence-based prosecution of intimate-partner
violence increased. In consequence, the Court forged a path of Constitutional jurisprudence
which has weakened the power of the Confrontation Clause, reverted to a disguised reliability
test reminiscent of Ohio v. Roberts, and diminished the rights of the accused. Simultaneously,
these rulings have created a hierarchy where the severity of private, domestic violence is
regarded as a lower level of emergency than public violence. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s
primary purpose test for testimonial statements should be replaced with a two-part test which
analyzes both the purpose and function of out-of-court statements, and evidence-based
prosecutions should be supported by policy solutions adopted at local and state levels.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose
A woman calls 911 and reports that her husband had beat her. She relays her address to
the dispatcher. The dispatcher asks for the name of the caller and the woman identifies herself as
Maria. The dispatcher then asks if Maria’s husband is still present and Maria informs the
operator that he left the house, drunk. The dispatcher asks Maria what had happened. Maria
identifies her husband by name, Mike, and informs the dispatcher that her husband came home
drunk and became angry with her—this had happened before. Maria explains that the fight
escalated, she had been hit and pushed and received a serious head wound when she fell
backward and slammed her head on the corner of the kitchen table. It was after this that her
husband stormed out. The 911 operator asks if an ambulance was needed and Maria answers
affirmatively. The dispatcher assures her that help is on the way and proceeds to ask Maria to
describe Mike, the suspect. Maria tells the dispatcher the height, weight, race, and distinguishing
characteristics of her husband, including a description of his clothing. The dispatcher asks how
long-ago Maria’s husband left the house and where Maria believes he may have gone. Maria
responds that it had been no more than five minutes; she had regained enough composure after
her fall to be able to make the phone call. Maria was not sure where he may have gone. The
dispatcher asks whether weapons were involved in the events Maria was describing, and Maria
answers that Mike owned a gun and had threatened to use it before, but he had not specifically
threatened her with it this time. She was not sure whether it was in its case or with him. Finally,
the dispatcher asks Maria whether police had been at her address before, and if so, how many
times and when the most recent time was. Maria answers that the police had been to her home
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twice before, the most recent being approximately three weeks earlier. The dispatcher stays on
the line with Maria until the police arrive at the scene.1
When the police and ambulance arrive at Maria’s home, Maria is examined by EMTs.
Maria’s injuries, the disorderly kitchen scene, and the corner of the dining room table where
small droplets of blood can be seen are photographed. EMTs ask Maria how she received her
injuries and she describes being pushed down and hitting her head on the table and how she
expected that bruises on her forearms were the result of being forcibly grabbed by her husband.
The responding police secure the scene, ask Maria a series of questions similar to those asked
during the 911 call, and commence a search for Maria’s husband after they receive a name
identification and a description. The police find Mike and arrest him for domestic battery. Once
the charges had been filed, a prosecutor contacts Maria to prepare testimony for Mike’s trial.
Maria refuses to cooperate.
Dynamics and Differences of Intimate-Partner Violence
Intimate-partner violence is a tragic and pervasive issue that affects more than 10 million
men and women in the United States per year.2 The Center for Disease Control has adopted the
term “intimate-partner violence” in lieu of domestic violence in order to recognize that violence
between intimate partners is not limited to the home or to legal conceptions of family.3 Maria’s

1

“Handling a Domestic Violence Call In-Service Training for Police Dispatchers.” Police Resources, 2003.
www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-dispatcher-stud.pdf.
The prior source was used to guide the creation of the hypothetical Maria and Mike scenario. The resource guide
served as an example of dispatcher questions to be asked during a response to a domestic violence call. The source
provided guidance for my choosing of questions for the scenario.
** Intimate-partner violence is not limited to male-on-female violence. This violence impacts people of all sexes and
impacts same-sex couples, as well. I recognize that IPV is nuanced and encompasses many diverse forms of
relationships, however the language of this project will default to pronouns which suggest male-on-female violence.
This choice was made not to suggest limitations on the scope of victims and relationships which IPV affects, but
rather to allow for linguistic clarity and reflect the language used in the majority of sources I utilized.
2
NCADV, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2018. https://ncadv.org/statistics.
3
National Domestic Violence Prosecution Best Practices Guide: White Paper, National District Attorneys Association,
Women Prosecutors Section, Alexandria, VA: March 16, 2017. p6.
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story, although an anecdotal fictional scenario, is not unlike many intimate-partner violence
cases that come before courts. Maria had experienced prior abuse, violence escalated, the police
become involved on multiple occasions, and before any prosecution begins, the woman recants
or refuses to cooperate with prosecutors. The dynamics of intimate-partner violence differ from
other crimes because the intimate relationship and shared life between the perpetrator and the
victim creates a knot of complications that must be untangled or cut before the criminal justice
system can operate effectively. Unlike other crime victims, battered women often cohabitate with
their abusers, they may share children, feel emotionally attached, or depend on their abuser for
financial support. Leaving an abusive partner, or choosing to involve oneself in a prosecution
process against a batterer whether leaving or not, requires victims to decide whether moving
forward with any action will make them safer and be beneficial, and whether they are capable of
successfully embarking on the leaving process.4 Intimate-partner violence affects people of all
social and economic classes, people from every level of education, and people from every corner
of the world.5 Consequently, the determination of benefits and the feasibility of leaving requires
a nuanced array of religious, cultural, economic, familial, and safety factors to be considered by
every victim. As many as fifty percent of all homeless women became homeless as a
consequence of leaving an abusive intimate partner.6 Intimate-partner violence and leaving such
situations are often indicative of resulting poverty. 7 Victims must consider the realities of more
difficult financial circumstances, the dynamics of single parenting or possibilities of losing

4

Michael P. Johnson and Kathleen J. Ferraro, “Research on Domestic Violence in the 1990s: Making Distinctions,”
Journal of Marriage and the Family 62(4);(2000): 948–63.
5
Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka, “Domestic Violence and Abuse in Intimate Relationship from Public Health Perspective,”
Health Psychology Research, no. 2(3) (November 2014). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4768593/.
6
American Civil Liberties Union, “Domestic Violence and Homelessness,” American Civil Liberties Union: Women’s
Rights Project, p.2-4.
7
Johnson and Ferraro.
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custody of children, and whether they will have access to bank accounts, assets, or a place to go
to receive assistance.8 Intimate-partner violence victims with immigrant or refugee status must
consider whether leaving or involving law enforcement will complicate their status; the fear of
an abuser may be lesser than the fear or deportation.9 Leaving can be the most dangerous point in
time for a battered woman. Abuse does not often end when the relationship does. Once a victim
leaves, the perpetrator often continues measures of harassment, stalks the victim, violates
restraining orders, or continues physical harm.10 One study demonstrated that seventy percent of
intimate partner violence injuries were inflicted after the relationship had ended.11 The decision
to leave is not simply a departure from a person—it is a departure from a lifestyle that the victim
may feel is safer than a lifestyle of homelessness, economic struggle, and loneliness.
In addition to the material consequences of leaving, victims of intimate-partner violence
are trapped within a dynamic of power and control which creates emotional and psychological
consequences that victims must weigh against the benefits of leaving. Intimate partner violence
is accompanied by psychological effects on victims including posttraumatic stress disorder,
depression, and a lacking sense of self-esteem.12 One study discovered that 63.8 percent of
women victimized by intimate partners suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.13 Often
intimate-partner violence cases which are brought before courts are examples of “intimate
terrorism” where an intimate partner practices general control over the victim. 14 This form of
violence often escalates, is often one-sided, and is more likely to result in serious injuries than

8

“Why Do Victims Stay?” accessed November 15, 2018, https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay.
Johnson and Ferraro.
10
Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka.
11
Ibid.
12
Johnson and Ferraro.
13
Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka.
14
Johnson and Ferraro.
9
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defensive or mutual violence.15 The effects of this form of violence affect other aspects of
victims’ lives. The negative psychological effects harm both physical and mental health and
result in victims more consistently missing work and becoming two-thirds as likely to be unable
to hold employment for more than thirty hours per week for more than six months than nonbattered women.16
Studies of abuse demonstrate that there are four stages which are cycled through that
reinforce dynamics of power and control. The first stage is identifiable by the steady building of
tension where the abuser becomes angry and the victim becomes increasingly more uneasy and
apologetic in order to diffuse tension.17 During the second stage the abuser acts out and engages
in behaviors which harm the victim.18 The third stage is identifiable as the “honeymoon phase”
where the abuser apologizes and asks for forgiveness; the abuser makes promises and tries to
shift blame to the victim or “gaslight” her about the severity of the abuse.19 Finally, during the
fourth stage the relationship will be calm; the abuser may give gifts and act on promises and the
victim may believe that the abuser has changed and the abuse is over. 20 It is this cycle which
creates complications in securing the testimony of victim-witnesses and contributes to the
privatization of this crime. Victims are less likely to involve law enforcement when they do not
consider their abuse to be criminal acts; the honeymoon phase and calm stage of the cycle of
abuse create feelings where victims feel as though their relationship and the harm they endure is

15

Ibid.
Ibid.
17
Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
16
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normal.21 Abusers make additional efforts to minimize the conceptions that the victim has about
the severity of the abuse they face.
In a study of jailhouse calls that abusers made to their intimate-partner victims the
researchers discovered that abusers were utilizing minimization tactics, appeals to sympathy, and
requests for recantation more than overt threats to coerce victims into backing out of
prosecutions.22 A five-step process was identified within these phone calls. First, the victim is
determined and strong and the abuser works to wear away these feelings of confidence.23 Second,
the abuser makes an effort to convince the victim that she is overreacting and asks the victim
whether she thinks that the abuser “deserves” the charges, the treatment in jail, or other
repercussions; he minimizes the severity of the attack while inflating the severity of his
punishment.24 The abuser often manages to frame the situation in a manner where he is the
victim and elicits sympathy and care from the woman he abused—the situation flips and the
battered woman is put in a place where her partner is seemingly in trouble and she must be the
one to “save him.”25 Third, the abuser bonds with the victim and the couple takes on an “us
against the world” mentality. 26 Fourth, the abuser asks the victim to remove herself from the
prosecution and recant, and fifth, the recantation plan and story are created.27 In most criminal
prosecutions outside of the intimate-partner violence sphere there is not the same complexity of
interaction between victim and perpetrator. If the victim is to be involved in a prosecution, the

21

“Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic Violence to the Police - FELSON - 2002 - Criminology - Wiley
Online Library,” accessed November 16, 2018, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.17459125.2002.tb00968.x.
22
“Jailhouse Phone Calls Reveal Why Domestic Violence Victims Recant -- ScienceDaily,” accessed November 15,
2018, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110815101535.htm.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
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prosecutorial system must often break the deep emotional, social, and economic bonds which
exist between the batterer and the battered—this is no easy task.
America’s adversarial legal system is set up as an awkward structure for intimate partner
violence cases to exist within because the system expects that there is an adverse relationship
between a victim and a perpetrator; however, intimate partner violence cases are not so black and
white.28 This grey area of determining whether or not a batterer is an adversary contributes to
high rates of uncooperative or recanting victims. In nearly eighty percent of all intimate-partner
violence cases the woman recants or refuses to cooperate.29 Consequently, the courts face
complications when working to prosecute batterers when there are non-cooperative witnesses.
Evidence-Based Prosecution
In response to the problem of recanting victims, many jurisdictions have adopted
“victimless” or “evidence-based” prosecution policies as a means of better responding to
intimate-partner violence (IPV). Duluth, Minnesota, San Diego, California, Los Angeles,
California, and Nashville, Tennessee were the trailblazing cities for these policies and Duluth
was the birthplace of a model used to understand the intricacies of intimate-partner violence
which describes IPV as a manifestation of power and control. These policies are characterized by
the prosecution of an alleged batterer without calling the victim to testify. Compulsory means of
securing victim testimony such as subpoenas are not used to secure the victim’s presence and
threats of jail-time and other legal consequences are not employed to encourage the victim to be
available for trial. These policies allowed for the prosecution of an alleged batterer to continue
without the direct and voluntary involvement of the victim. The goals of intimate-partner
violence laws are to punish offenders, prevent future offenders, and empower and assist

28
29

Jones, Ann. Next Time, She'll Be Dead: Battering & How to Stop It. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000.
National Domestic Violence Prosecution Best Practices Guide.
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victims.30 Evidence-based prosecution approaches these goals by leading to higher conviction
rates and allowing victims to focus on personal needs and safety rather than upcoming trials, but
do, quite literally, remove the voice of the victim from the trial. Evidence-based prosecutions
utilize 911 call recordings, photos of the crime scene and victim, physical evidence such as
ripped clothing, medical evaluation forms, expert testimony, statements of the accused, and even
police body-camera footage to build a case against the defendant.31 The victim, however, will not
be called to the witness stand to tell her story or be cross-examined. Maria’s example case would
be a good candidate for an evidence-based prosecution. However, statements that Maria made
out of court may violate the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment guarantee for the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. This creates a significant tension between the
Confrontation Clause and the successful prosecutions of batterers with evidence-based
prosecution. If Maria does not appear in court but her statements that identified Mike as her
abuser and connected his violent actions to her injuries are entered in to evidence, then Mike’s
rights of confrontation may have been swept under the rug for the sake of bringing intimatepartner violence out in the open.
Evidence-Based Prosecution and Ohio v. Roberts
Evidence-based prosecution policies were working well under the framework of Ohio v.
Roberts (1980) which dictated the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause until 2004. Roberts
allowed for hearsay statements to be admitted when a declarant is absent from trial and
unavailable for cross-examination if the hearsay statements bore “adequate indicia of
reliability…inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted

30

Buzawa, Eva S., and Carl G. Buzawa. Domestic Violence: the Criminal Justice Response. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage
Publications, 2003.
31
Klein, Andrew R., and Jessica L. Klein. Abetting Batterers: What Police, Prosecutors and Courts Aren’t Doing to
Protect America’s Women. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
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hearsay exception” or where there are “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 32 This
meant that statements made by domestic abuse victims to dispatchers during 911 calls and
statements made to the police and medical examiners were generally admissible under state and
federal rules of evidence. These rules carve out exceptions to hearsay. According to Federal
Rules of Evidence rule 801, hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”33
Hearsay statements are generally objectionable and inadmissible in court unless the statement
falls under a hearsay exception under rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. These
exceptions allow for, among other things, “excited utterances” and “statements for the purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment” to be admitted in court. Consequently, under the rule of
Roberts, statements made during 911 calls were generally considered to fall under the excited
utterance exception, statements about injury were generally admitted as statements for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment, and statements made to responding police officers were
categorized as reliable in a variety of different ways. In the case of Maria and Mike, most all of
Maria’s statements would have been admissible under Roberts. Excited utterances are
statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”34 Maria’s statements to the 911 dispatcher
and to the police who responded were on the topic of the startling event of abuse, and testifying
officers would need to say no more than “the victim seemed stressed” or describe that the victim
was trembling or her voice was shaking to establish the stress of the situation and qualify a

32

Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Fed. Rules Evid. 801(c).
34
Fed. Rules Evid. 803(2).
33
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statement as an excited utterance.35 Under the rule of Ohio v. Roberts statements which identified
abusers, described crimes, and established integral facts of criminal cases were being admitted
into evidence without cross-examination despite the Sixth Amendment guarantee that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”36
In 2004 the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion, Crawford v.
Washington. This decision tackled the issue of statements being offered to prove cases without
being subject to cross examination. This case overturned Ohio v. Roberts and created a new
framework that dictated the admissibility of hearsay statements in court. Prior to the Crawford
decision the Sixth Amendment coupled with Ohio v. Roberts generally had more bark than bite
and allowed for a “heads I win, tails you lose” system that was unforgiving to criminal
defendants in all criminal cases.37 Crawford turned this around but impeded the progress of
evidence-based prosecutions and catalyzed a lineage of further Supreme Court decisions that
wrestled with the Confrontation Clause and unavailable witnesses. Each subsequent decision has
changed the landscape of evidence-based prosecution, but none has ironed out all the wrinkles of
the system. Today, Crawford dictates the rules for legal proceedings without victim involvement,
but subsequent cases have dulled its effect in protecting the Sixth Amendment. Both evidencebased prosecution and the Confrontation Clause play important roles in protecting individuals
and it is imperative that each of these values be allowed to function symbiotically with one
another.

35

King-Ries, Andrew, “Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?,” Seattle U. L. Rev., (January 1,
2005) p.301.
36
United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment.
37
Stras, David, Orin Kerr, Rachel Barkow, Stephanos Bibas, and Paul J. Larkin Jr., “Justice Scalia and the Criminal
Law,” U. Cin. L. Rev. 743(86); (2018).

16
Crawford v. Washington and the New Framework
Crawford v. Washington was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in
2004 and was decided unanimously in favor of the petitioner, Michael Crawford. Justice Antonin
Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and Justice Rehnquist authored a concurring opinion.
Michael Crawford had been charged with assault and attempted murder; although this case
resulted in serious consequences for domestic violence cases, it was not itself a domestic
violence case. In 1999, Sylvia Crawford informed her husband, Michael Crawford, that a man by
the name of Kenneth Lee had tried to rape her.38 In response, Michael and Sylvia went to Lee’s
apartment and Michael stabbed him. Michel Crawford was arrested the same night and both
Sylvia and Michael were interrogated by the police at the police station.39 Michael told the police
that a fight had ensued after Sylvia disclosed that Lee had attempted to rape her, and Michael had
stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso. Sylvia’s interrogation was recorded and her story matched
Michael’s at nearly every point save whether Lee had pulled a weapon on Michael before or after
Michael attacked.40 Michael Crawford claimed self-defense and asserted marital privilege for his
trial, and consequently Sylvia Crawford was barred from testifying in-person and deemed legally
unavailable.41 However, Washington’s marital privilege law allows for admissible hearsay
statements by the accused’s spouse to be admitted, and the prosecution played the recording of
Sylvia’s interrogation for the jury. 42 The Washington State Supreme Court decided that the
statements were reliable because they interlocked with Michael’s account of the stabbing.43
During her interrogation Sylvia Crawford told the police that she had helped facilitate a planned

38

Crawford v. Washington at 36.
Ibid.
40
Crawford v. Washington at 37.
41
Crawford v. Washington at 38.
42
Crawford v. Washington. at 36.
43
Crawford v. Washington at 39.
39
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attack and her account of whether Lee had pulled a weapon undermined Michael’s self-defense
claim.44 Sylvia’s statements helped convict Michael of both assault and attempted murder despite
never having been subject to cross-examination. Michael Crawford appealed and cited a
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation. The United States Supreme Court
heard the case and issued an opinion which would overturn Roberts and change the relationship
between hearsay rules and the Sixth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Washington State
Supreme Court and determined that the use of Sylvia Crawford’s unconfronted statements
violated Michael Crawford’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Court began narrating
its decision by turning to the historical background of the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia
wrote that the right to confrontation can be traced back to Roman times but was bolstered under
English Common Law.45 In 1603 Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with treason, and during his
trial an alleged accomplice’s letter which discussed Raleigh’s involvement in the crime was read
to the jury. Raleigh asserted that the alleged accomplice was not writing for truth but writing in
self-interest and called for the alleged accomplice to be brought to the stand to testify in person.
The presiding judge denied the request—Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.46 In
response to this trial, the English law was reformed to require confrontation “face to face.” 47 This
historic trial marks the origin of fears about trial by affidavit. 48 In 1791 the Sixth Amendment
was ratified, and the rule of cross-examination secured in Common Law in 1693 was being
abided by in American legal systems.49 Additionally, many early United States state court

44

Crawford v. Washington at 37.
Crawford v. Washington at 41.
46
Crawford v. Washington at 43.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Crawford v. Washington at 45.
45
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decisions reflected utmost adherence to the protection of the right to confrontation. 50 Justice
Scalia concluded that this history demonstrated that ex parte, (from the party, one-sided)
examinations were to be prevented by confrontation and that the law of evidence should not
supersede the rule of the United States Constitution and should apply to all testimony, both inand out-of-court made by “witnesses”.51 Justice Scalia looked to the dictionary definitions of
“witnesses” and “testimony” to clarify his opinion about where the Confrontation Clause applies:
It applies to “witnesses” against the accused—in other words, those who “bear
testimony” … “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.52
Scalia’s decision clarified that any statements made by “witnesses” and considered to be
“testimonial,” whether made in- or out-of-court, must satisfy the Confrontation Clause before
becoming admissible in court. The Court chose not to define what makes a statement testimonial
save identifying a few core classes:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist “ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially…
extrajudicial statements… contained in formalized testimonial materials such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions… statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.53
The result of this definition is a stricter, but ambiguous understanding of the Sixth Amendment.
The “primary object” of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay—
hearsay that is testimonial must have been subject to an opportunity for cross-examination while
nontestimonial hearsay is governed by the Rules of Evidence.54

50

Ibid.
Crawford v. Washington at 49.
52
Crawford v. Washington at 50.
53
Ibid.
54
Crawford v. Washington at 52.
51
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Crawford v. Washington also set the requirement that in order for testimonial hearsay to
be admitted, the declarant-witness must either be present for trial to testify, or unavailable to
testify and have been previously subject to cross-examination.55 The Court asserted that the
Roberts’ doctrine was incapable of protecting the original values of the Confrontation Clause
because it was simultaneously too broad and too narrow.56 The ruling did not distinguish
admissibility requirements between ex parte testimony and other hearsay, and allowed for
statements to be admitted under ambiguous requirements of reliability. The Confrontation Clause
was intended to be a procedure which guarantees reliability, not a tool to use only when there are
suspicions that evidence may be unreliable.57 “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”58
Crawford warns of the dangers of leaving too much power up to individual judicial
discretion. Malleable rules can easily be manipulated, and even when the manipulation is utilized
to secure a positive end, the underlying dangerous effects can undermine rights. Standards
should be solid and understandable to ensure uniformity and fairness across judicial
jurisdictions—the same “meaningful protection” of Sixth Amendment rights could not be
guaranteed under the unpredictable framework of Roberts.59 The Crawford decision overturned
Roberts, though not retroactively and not clearly. Although the Crawford opinion expresses
concern over ambiguities and loose ends of the Roberts ruling, the opinion left ambiguous and

55

Crawford v. Washington at 53.
Crawford v. Washington at 60.
57
Crawford v. Washington at 61.
58
Crawford v. Washington at 62.
59
Ibid.
56
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loose the integral definition of “testimonial statements” and chose to “leave for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition.” 60
Ambiguities in Interpretation
Following the issuance of the Crawford decision, judicial jurisdictions were left waiting
for the day that a clearer definition would be handed down from the Supreme Court. This
definitional ambiguity left prosecutors utilizing evidence-based prosecution strategies for
domestic violence cases with questions about how to go forward with their procedures without
violating the new Crawford framework and further, the Sixth Amendment. Prosecutors struggled
to successfully bring forward intimate-partner violence cases without the involvement of the
victim. The Administrative Office of the Courts for Washington State followed domestic
violence conviction rates from 1999 to 2010 and discovered that beginning in 2004 there was a
dramatic decrease in the number of successful convictions.61 Sixty prosecutor’s offices located in
California, Oregon, and Washington were surveyed following the Crawford decision. Sixty-three
percent of the responding offices asserted that Crawford “significantly impeded prosecutions of
domestic violence;” seventy-six percent reported that they were more likely to drop charges for
domestic violence altogether if the victim’s participation could not be secured. 62 More than half
of the surveyed prosecutor’s offices were counting on the use of testimonial hearsay in more than
fifty percent of their domestic violence cases; following the Crawford decision, this number
dropped to thirty-two percent, and that percentage required a broad interpretation of the
decision.63 The roadblock that Crawford put in place extended to inhibit law enforcement, as
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well. The lackluster prosecution success across the board created a lack of incentive for law
enforcement to target aggressors of intimate-partner violence.64 Most alarmingly, in the same
survey of prosecutor’s offices, sixty-five percent of the surveyed offices believed that their
jurisdictions were less safe for victims of intimate-partner violence than before.65 It is here that
the conflict between Crawford’s effects and the successful protection of victims of intimatepartner violence is most clearly understood— if Crawford and the Sixth Amendment operated at
full force then either evidence-based prosecution must fall by the wayside and intimate-partner
violence could be hidden behind closed doors, or evidence-based prosecution could be practiced
but a small exception would have to be cut from the understanding of the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford created an ambiguous test that could either be followed at the risk of sacrificing
evidence-based prosecution and reprivatizing intimate-partner abuse or manipulated in order to
present a case without victim testimony.
Immediate Consequences of Crawford
In response, Judges in different jurisdictions across the country interpreted Crawford in
very different ways and developed a variety of different tests to determine whether statements
were testimonial. The different jurisdictional decisions demonstrate a lack of clarity surrounding
how far Sixth Amendment protections extend and a lack of consistency, even among decisions
made within the same state. For example, in Texas’s Court of Appeals Twelfth District the court
applied the “primary purpose test” to classify statements as testimonial and applied Roberts
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when the court ruled statements nontestimonial.66 Spencer v. State67 from Texas’s Fourteenth
District Appellate Court and Moore v. State from the Sixth District each used a combination of a
“formality test” and the “primary purpose test” to determine whether a statement was
testimonial.68 However, at the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas the court opted for an entirely
new test to pass down to the district courts. Wall v. State from the Court of Criminal Appeals
adopted the “reasonable expectation” test to identify testimonial statements.69 In California, in
the Sixth Appellate District, the case People v. Caudillo70 adopted a compound test of “primary
purpose” and a “core class” test while the Second Appellate District adopted a bright-line rule
that spontaneous statements are not hearsay and wove the “formality” test through the People v.
Corella opinion.71 In New York, a criminal court in Bronx County ruled in People v. Moscat that
911 calls are per se not testimonial under the “primary purpose test.”72 However, the Supreme
Court of New York turned the Moscat reasoning upside-down and determined that 911 calls are
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actually per se testimonial due to their formality and the “reasonable expectation test.”73 An
appellate court in Ohio ruled that Crawford is only applicable to hearsay statements that do not
fall under Common Law hearsay exceptions.74 In Massachusetts, the State Supreme Court
determined in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves that statements made to police during the course of
an investigation are per se testimonial unless the police are involved in “caretaking or stabilizing
a volatile situation.”75 The Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals decided that a
“statement made knowingly to authorities describing criminal activity is almost always
testimonial” as a general premise for the reasonable expectation test.76 The vast differences in
court rulings across the nation, and even between jurisdictions within the same states
demonstrate that Crawford’s promise of “interim uncertainty” held true. In general, court
decisions can be characterized by having used one, or a combination of, four kinds of tests:
“formality,” “reasonable expectation,” “primary purpose,” and bright-line rules. Although there
are a few jurisdictions which produced outliers to these categories, these four provide the
framework for understanding the ambiguity following Crawford as well as the framework for
potential steps at settling the uncertainty.
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Post-Crawford Concerns
Even fourteen years after the Crawford decision, and many years after subsequent court
rulings made to clarify the ambiguous requirements of Crawford, these tests are being applied in
different manners across the country. The formality test measures whether the circumstances of
when the statement was made were formal enough to indicate that the statement was more than a
casual statement to a friend, but rather more similar to depositions taken by magistrates under the
Common Law.77 Under this test, statements made to law enforcement officers in response to
structured questioning, in secured or official areas, or recorded statements that are preserved in
an official capacity are often encapsulated under the definition of testimonial. The reasonable
expectation test, sometimes referred to as the “objective observer test” measures whether an
observer (or the declarant) would reasonably expect from the circumstances surrounding their
statement, that their statement will be used for either prosecutorial purposes or to aid in an
investigation.78 The primary purpose test, which was later articulated in the Supreme Court case
Davis v. Washington (2006) classifies statements as testimonial if the primary purpose is to
“prove past facts potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” and nontestimonial “when
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”79 The main difference between the primary purpose test and the reasonable
expectation test is the point of view. The primary purpose test hinges on whether the police are
eliciting statements with prosecution in mind, and the reasonable expectation test determines
whether a statement is testimonial based on the mindset of the declarant-witness. Finally, brightline tests qualify specific kinds of statements or statements made in particular settings as either
per se testimonial or per se nontestimonial.

25
Crawford’s ambiguous decision left the door open for diverse tests to be used which led
to unpredictable results. The decision allowed courts a great amount of latitude within which to
build their Sixth Amendment framework and left a multitude of questions unanswered. How do
evidence-based prosecutions go forward following Crawford, if at all? How do courts manage
hearsay after the Sixth Amendment has been satisfied? Is Roberts overturned in its entirety or do
indicia of reliability serve as an acceptable basis of admittance for hearsay if Crawford is
satisfied? What should courts make of statements to advocates, medical examiners, or off-duty
police officers? Which test best protects the integrity of the Sixth Amendment but also does not
re-privatize domestic violence, sexual assault cases, and child abuse cases where the victim may
become unavailable? Lower courts attempted to answer some of these unanswered questions
within the wide scope of directional latitude they were granted by the Crawford decision.
However, this wide scope created dangers for the integrity of the courts, the protection of the
Sixth Amendment, and the efficacy of evidence-based prosecution. Justice Scalia warned of this
danger within the Crawford decision:
[The Framers] knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always be
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people… They were loath to leave too much
discretion in judicial hands. By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with openended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable,
and, while that might be a small concern in run-of the-mill assault prosecutions like this
one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like Raleigh’s—great state
trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not
be so clear. It is difficult to imagine Roberts’ providing any meaningful protection in
those circumstances.80
Justice Scalia warned about affording judges too much latitude for discretionary power, putting
too much faith in open-ended tests, and for implementing manipulable standards and cautioned
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that Roberts was a danger and not a tool for constitutional protection. Justice Scalia is famous for
being an originalist and was a staunch advocate for minimizing the amount of discretionary
power that judges had, in general.81 However, Crawford’s lack of a concise definition of
testimonial and what the Sixth Amendment presides over allowed for the Crawford progeny to
expand and twist the Crawford ruling. The effect that Crawford had on the efficacy of evidencebased prosecution may have been, and could still be, shaping the interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.82 Crawford has been worked to the point that at the presentday juncture, statements that the Framers and Justice Scalia may have anticipated the Sixth
Amendment to cover are not in fact protected by the Confrontation Clause, and the current Sixth
Amendment protections are circling back to the same feeble protections offered under the
Roberts framework.
Further, the Crawford v. Washington decision puts prosecutors of intimate-partner
violence in a difficult position. In order to go forward with evidence-based prosecution they must
either potentially abuse the Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation or pressure victims to
testify earlier or more aggressively than is ideal.83 The victims of intimate-partner violence are
similarly put between a rock and a hard place—either choose to participate and face potential
consequences of retribution and threats, or face the consequences of letting the perpetrator go
free when the charges are dropped due to a lack of evidence consequential of choosing not to
participate.84
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Purpose of Thesis
This thesis will consider how to restore the function of Crawford in a way which does not
re-privatize domestic violence. The story of Maria and Mike will serve as a scenario to apply to
multiple forthcoming examples to in order to clarify points and allow for abstract concepts to be
applied more concretely. This thesis will consider the implications of Crawford and its progeny
and suggest multiple policies and definitions which should be adopted in order to settle the
“interim uncertainty” which has remained pervasive since Crawford in 2004.85
The subsequent chapters of this thesis will argue that the Crawford lineage of cases has
weakened the effects of the Crawford decision in a manner that warns of a judicial overstep. I
will consider how it is imperative that courts not enter a vicious cycle where the strength of the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation ebbs and flows with further Supreme Court decisions,
but simultaneously argue that protecting evidence-based prosecution is essential to protecting
victims of intimate-partner violence in Chapter Three. The answer to the Crawford cycle of
constitutional crisis which conflicts with evidence-based prosecution is not simply further
judicial decisions, but rather a commitment to clear definitions and jurisdictional commitments
to policy solutions. This thesis will clearly lay out the subsequent decisions which contributed to
the weakening of Crawford and provide suggestions for policy solutions that require efforts from
the courts, law enforcement, community support systems, and prosecutors in order to provide
equal protection to both the Amendment and the accused as well as victims of intimate partner
violence.
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Chapter 2: Cases and Consequences
Crawford v. Washington left the relationship between the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause and out-of-court statements in a haze of “interim uncertainty” until 2006
when the Supreme Court decided two cases in a combined opinion known as Davis v.
Washington.86 Davis combined two fact patterns, and the ultimate holding rendered the primary
purpose test the law of the land for determining which statements are testimonial, and therefore
subject to the Confrontation Clause, and which are not. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and
elaborated the rule as:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.87
A corresponding footnote in the majority opinion notes that the Davis fact patterns were only
expansive enough to allow the Court to decide on the issue of testimonial statements as they
relate to police interrogations and where the role of police and responsibility of interrogation can
extend to 911 operators.88 Thus, this holding does not comment on the testimonial nature of
statements made to non-law enforcement officers or off-duty officers, nor does it dictate a rule
on statements made to officers without provocation or questioning from an officer. The fact
patterns of these two cases are significant for comparison and contrast to subsequent decisions in
the Crawford progeny and make a difference in the workability of the primary purpose test that
the facts ultimately led to.

86

Crawford v. Washington at 69 footnote 10.
Davis v. Washington at 820.
88
Davis v. Washington at 820 footnote 1.
87

29
Davis v. Washington Fact Pattern
In Davis v. Washington, Michelle McCottry made a 911 call which disconnected, and led
to a return call from the operator.89 The operator established through questioning that McCottry
had called because she was being abused in her home by her ex-boyfriend.90 The operator asked
if there were weapons used or alcohol involved, and McCottry reported “He’s usin’ his fists,”
and the alleged abuser had not been drinking.91 It was at this point that the 911 operator informed
McCottry that help was on the way and she was to stay on the line and listen while additional
questions were asked.92 The 911 operator gathered the full name of the alleged abuser, Adrian
Martell Davis, and then McCottry informed the operator that Davis was running and leaving in a
car.93 The operator told McCottry to “Stop talking and answer my questions,” and proceeded to
accumulate information about Davis, including his birthday, reason for being present at the
house, and additional information about the assault.94 The police arrived at the scene
approximately four minutes after the call and observed McCottry as “shaken” and “frantic.” 95
McCottry did not testify in the subsequent trial against Adrian Davis, but her recorded
statements made during the 911 call were played to the jury; with those statements, the two
testifying officers were able to connect McCottry’s injuries to her account of the attack. 96 Davis
was convicted and the Supreme Court of Washington determined that the portion of the call
which identified Davis was not testimonial.97
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Hammon v. Indiana Fact Pattern
Hammon v. Indiana is also a case of intimate-partner violence, but the facts are quite
different. The victim, Amy Hammon, did not reach out to the police, herself, but rather police
responded to her and her husband, Hershel Hammon, after receiving a report of a domestic
disturbance.98 When the police arrived, Amy was on her porch and perceived as “somewhat
frightened,” though she informed the police that nothing was wrong and gave permission to go
inside of her home.99 The police observed a broken heating unit and shattered glass in the living
room and found Hershel Hammon in the kitchen.100 One officer asked Amy to explain what had
happened; meanwhile, Hershel made multiple attempts to interrupt and interject this
conversation.101 Amy told police that she had been shoved and hit, furniture was broken, her van
was made unusable, and her daughter was attacked.102 She signed a battery affidavit including
this information.103
Amy did not appear for Hershel’s trial, but the questioning officer narrated her statements
and provided authentication for the battery affidavit.104 Both Amy’s hearsay statements and the
affidavit were admitted as “excited utterances” and a “present sense impression,” respectively,
despite objections regarding the Sixth Amendment.105 The affidavit was determined to be
testimonial due to its use as a preservative of potential evidence, but its admission was ruled to
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.106
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Comparison of Temporal Reasoning in Davis and Hammon
The key differences in these two cases lie within the timeline and the formality of the
events; however, it is not these differences that necessarily underlie the reasoning for the
differing determinations regarding the testimonial nature of the victims’ statements. The
circumstances of each intimate-partner attack are important to note because they demonstrate
inconsistencies within these decisions and future decisions pertaining to the Sixth Amendment
which come before the court. Namely, during the phone call with the 911 operator, Michelle
McCottry specifically states that the perpetrator was leaving. It is not entirely clear from the
decision precisely when the ongoing emergency ends and the ensuing questioning becomes an
interrogation that produced testimonial statements, but it seems as though when the threat was
separated from the threatened the words that McCottry spoke were no longer the narration of
events as they took place, but rather a recantation of past events and statements which would
serve as the functional equivalent of testimony elicited in court. The operator asked McCottry
specific questions about Davis including his birthday and reasons for being present at the home.
Knowledge of an alleged abuser’s birthday cannot be integral to resolving an emergency; the
information goes to further proving the identity of an alleged perpetrator to allow for easier
searches of records, but it does not serve the purpose of stopping an attack and resolving an
emergency. Further, the operator asked for the reason why Davis was present at the home 107.
This question and its consequent answer provide information about the means which made a
crime possible or the motive for the ensuing attack, but they do little to provide a remedy to the
abuse which had just ensued. This narration of past events, the narration of why Davis was in the
home in the first place, resembles the kind of story which, if she had chosen to be involved with

107

Davis v. Washington at 816.

32
the prosecution, Michelle McCottry would have taken the stand to repeat during a trial against
Davis. However, one of the cited reasons why McCottry’s phone call and a few of her statements
to the arriving police officers were admitted as nontestimonial excited utterances and present
sense impressions was because she had been narrating events as they were occurring.108
However, following Davis’s departure from the home, this is less convincing.
In the case of Amy and Hershel Hammon, the statements of Amy Hammon were ruled
testimonial because when the officers arrived, the statements that she gave to officers were those
which narrated past events and the previous emergency was no longer unfolding. This creates an
interesting tension between the reasoning of Hammon and the reasoning of Davis. In Hammon,
the alleged abuser was still present at the home and was actively trying to insert himself into
situations with his victim, despite police action to stop him. The situation was no longer an
emergency despite the perpetrator and the victim still being in proximity to one another and the
perpetrator exhibiting aggressive tendencies. On the other hand, McCottry was ruled to have
been facing an ongoing emergency even when the alleged abuser had fled the scene and
separated himself from his victim. The distance did not resolve the emergency. The temporal
differences of these two fact patterns, however, may justify the decisions regarding
emergencies—McCottry’s phone call spanned from during, or just after the attack to only
minutes after the attack while Hammon’s discussions with officers may have taken place any
span of time after the attack had commenced. However, because of the factual differences
regarding the presence of the threat tell a different story—McCottry’s threat had departed while
Hammon was left for a span of time alone, with her attacker present. The decisions defining an
ongoing emergency in these cases demonstrate that defining “emergency” is a temporal decision
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in relation to the freshness of the crime instead of a decision based on whether the threatening
subject has been separated from the threatened subject.
Consider the Mike and Maria hypothetical in comparison to Davis and Michelle
McCottry’s statements. Maria was calling 911 to report that her husband had beaten her and that
he had already left the home, but no more than five minutes ago. She notes that an ambulance is
necessary to tend to her head wound. She also notes that Mike owns a gun, had threatened her
with it in the past, and she does not know if he has it with him or not. Maria is certainly relaying
information about a past crime to an arm of the police in response to structured questioning. Her
words, which incriminate her husband Mike, connect him to physical evidence and injury, and
ultimately lead to his arrest certainly serve as an out-of-court alternative to in-court testimony.
Now consider Michelle McCottry’s statements. She relays Davis’s name and connects him to the
crime by identifying his weapon (his fists) and describing that “he’s here jumpin’ on me again”
(emphasis added).109 These statements by McCottry were ruled to be nontestimonial because
they were made during the course of an ongoing emergency considering that Davis was still
present at the home while McCottry was responding. What if in the hypothetical Maria had
specifically said, “He was here jumpin’ on me again,” and responded to “Are there any
weapons?” with “No. He was usin’ his fists.”? These words would identical to the nontestimonial
statements made by Michelle McCottry save the tense of these statements. The statements would
have been in the past tense but describing events that happened no more than five minutes ago.
This comparison demonstrates that the difference between what is considered nontestimonial and
what is likely considered testimonial lies in the tense of the statement and not in the accusatory
function of the statements. Whether in past or present tense, each of these statements serve the
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purpose of accusing another person of a crime in response to formalized, structured questioning
by agents of the police. Whether past or present tense, each of these statements are declarations
or affirmations “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”110 The fact that
Davis is able to separate testimonial statements from the declarant and the function of proving
fact and make them into affirmations conditional on time and relationship to an emergency
separates Davis from the initial force of Crawford. This test should not discriminate against
statements based on the tense the declarant uses nor entirely invalidate victim statements because
they were not safe enough or able to call for help until the dangerous situation had calmed.
Comparison of Formality Between Davis and Hammon
The formality of the two modes of questioning also played a role in contrasting the two
cases but did not necessarily find its way into defining the parameters of testimonial. In Davis
the questioning took place over a 911 phone call. The call was determined to be informal and
therefore less likely to be testimonial; however, many jurisdictions and 911 training programs
have a specific and structured script for 911 operators to stick to while gathering information to
dispatch officers. For example, consider these instructions for responding to calls reporting
domestic violence from a 911 dispatch officer student manual created by the New Jersey
Division of Criminal Justice:111
During a call for assistance, the dispatcher should ask the following questions:
1. Where is the emergency? What address? What apartment number?
2. Who am I speaking to?
3. What has happened?
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4. Has anyone been injured? If yes, is an ambulance needed?
5. Are you the victim? If no, are you a witness?
6. Is the suspect present? What is his/her name? Please describe the suspect. If the
suspect is not present, where does the caller believe the suspect is.
7. Are weapons involved? If yes, what kind?
8. Is the suspect under the influence of drugs or alcohol? If yes, what substance?
9. Are children present? If yes, how many? How old?
10. Are other people present? If yes, how many?
11. Have the police been to this address before? If yes, how many times? When was the
last time?
12. Does the victim have a current restraining order?
13. A telephone number where the caller can be called back.
A comparison of the order, text, and purpose of these questions to the questions used by the 911
operator in the Mike and Maria hypothetical which were based off a different training manual
demonstrate that the general organization and structure of these calls are nearly identical across
different jurisdictions. There is rhythm and reason to each question and the question that follows
which makes the operation of the calls and the ensuing response more streamlined. With this in
mind, consider the definition of “formality” from the Merriam Webster Dictionary: “compliance
with formal or conventional rules; an established form or procedure that is required or
conventional.”112 The congruence of the form between different jurisdictions demonstrates that
this procedure is both established and conventional, which would qualify 911 calls as formalized
interrogations. However, the approach that the Davis v. Washington decision takes frames 911
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calls as often the opposite because the caller, in this case McCottry, was answering questions
over the phone and in a chaotic setting.113 This take on the interrogation’s formality is
problematic because it shifts the role of the integral viewpoint away from the interrogator and to
the person answering questions—this is the opposite of the integral viewpoint in the primary
purpose test—and makes this structured questioning nontestimonial because the respondent is
not constrained by formality. This conflicts with the Court’s Crawford holding which made
interrogations by law enforcement a core class, and particularly at odds with Justice Scalia’s
footnote four:
We use the term “interrogation” in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense
(citation omitted) … Just as various definitions of “testimonial” exist, one can imagine
various definitions of “interrogation,” and we need not select among them in this case.
Sylvia’s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition (emphasis added).114
The Supreme Court determined in Davis that the 911 operator questioning McCottry was an act
of the police.115 If “under any conceivable definition” knowingly given responses to structured
police questioning are testimonial, then McCottry’s knowingly given statements made in
response to structured questioning by a police agent should have been considered testimonial.
However, the Court notedly made a viewpoint shift which saved the case. In Crawford,
interrogations were made to be such by the structure and function of the questions and the officer
asking such questions; no mention was made of an additional qualification for the respondent to
be of a particular demeanor or cognizant of a formality level. In Davis, the Court justified their
addendum to the once clear core class by inserting “and of course even when interrogation exists
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it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogators questions, that the
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”116
The problem with this viewpoint shift is not that it considers the perspective and
demeanor of the respondent, but that it is inconsistent with the remainder of the Davis decision,
is a form of cherry-picking rules to achieve a desired result, and distorts the core class that had
been clearly laid out in Crawford. The determination of a statement’s testimonial nature should
either be based upon an analysis of the questioner’s viewpoint, the declarant’s viewpoint,
specifically defined as a joint-test, or a different test altogether—but what the Court should not
do is flip-flop which viewpoint is scrutinized to avoid coming to an unattractive conclusion,
namely that 911 calls are structured police questioning and per se testimonial. I do not argue that
911 calls should be per se testimonial, but rather I make this point to show that if formality hints
at a testimonial nature, and structured questioning by police officers or agents is per se
testimonial, then the formalized, structured nature of 911 calls should be testimonial under this
definition—but they are not. This points at an inconsistency which was created to make cases
workable for the prosecution, which is not a fair reason for a decision.
Testimony Erroneously Made the Product of a Relationship
The Davis decision further differs from Crawford and creates difficulties for the
workability of the primary purpose testimonial test because it makes testimonial statements the
products of a relationship instead of inherent members of core classes and products of witnesses.
In Crawford the active voice belongs to the declarant, and it is the declarant who has the power
to turn a statement into one that is either testimonial or nontestimonial. For example, “an accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person
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who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”117 The difference between these two
kinds of statements (casual remarks and testimony) is not their relationship, or lack thereof, to an
emergency, nor differences in the primary purposes of the police officers’ questions. Rather, the
difference between these two kinds of statements regards the level of solemnity of the speaker
and the speaker’s function. To bear testimony or witness against someone requires no
relationship other than an active speaker and a present listener. Taking such action to formulate
such a statement does not require particular external environmental factors nor a specific type of
listener, but only the active choice by a declarant to voice or write a statement which has the
effect of establishing or proving some fact. A “formal statement to government officers” can be
made inside or outside the constraints of an ongoing emergency, and Crawford pays no mind to
the subsequent actions of the law enforcement officer when making the assertion that this formal
statement would be testimonial. The declarant should bear the power to create a testimonial
statement, not situational factors—if the speaker makes a “solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” then the statement made was
testimonial. Davis, on the other hand, distorts this clear understanding by switching the point of
view and the creative power to the law enforcement officer and the circumstances surrounding
each statement. When statements made during police interrogations are surrounded by
circumstances that suggest an emergency must be attended to by police and the statements would
be helpful in reaching a resolution to that emergency, then the circumstances and the necessity of
the police to respond to the emergency override the creative power of the declarant. The
declarant is removed from the active role of creating testimony based on the subject and inherent
accusatory value of her statement and put in the passive role of having testimony, or
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nontestimonial statements elicited from her. Consequently, testimonial statements become a
product of their environment rather than an inherent form of speech like imperative, declarative,
interrogatory, and exclamatory statements. Some scholars, including Justice Scalia, himself, held
the belief that it was too subjective to make a determination about the intent of the declarant
while they made a statement and that this subjectivity required the testimonial test to concentrate
on the purpose of the second-party, whether a listener or a law enforcement agent.118 It can be
derived from Davis that nearly identical statements made under different circumstances can be
classified differently as long as the relationship to an emergency or the intent of the listener can
be argued as different. This is neither workable, nor does it protect from the abuses that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause was implemented to protect against.
The Diminished Scope of Testimonial Core Classes
Crawford laid out that the core classes which were named in Chapter One “all share a
common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around
it” (emphasis added).119 These core classes include “statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations” and make no mention of an additional condition for an absence of an
emergency-in-progress or for the primary motivation of the interrogator to be to collect evidence
for an impending prosecution.120 Rather, the decision calls for statements made in the course of
police interrogation to be a core upon which additional protections are built. Adding conditionals
where statements made in the course of police interrogation are testimonial only if made when
there are no circumstances that indicate an ongoing emergency or only if the responses are

118

Rouhanian, Anoosha. “A Call for Change: The Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic
Violence and Rape Prosecutions, “Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice, 37(1); (2017). p.11.
119
Crawford v. Washington at 51.
120
Ibid.

40
proving past fact chip away at the nucleus of this protection rather than garner additional
protections outside of the core.121
The core classes of testimonial statements set forth in the Crawford decision have
nothing to do with whether there is an ongoing emergency nor take in to any consideration the
primary purpose of the police. Rather, these core classes establish that certain kinds of materials
and statements inherently have the purpose of proving some fact and serve as the functional
equivalent of a witness at trial.122 The purpose and function of these core classes is derived from
either the expectation of the declarant, a level of formality, and the substance of the statements
which make them inculpatory. The Framers were likely unconcerned with whether declarants
had made statements used as ex parte evidence under conditions indicating an ongoing
emergency, or whether they were ex parte regardless of exterior conditions. Ex parte testimony
was subject to the Confrontation Clause. In the cases that Justice Scalia cites as early state
decisions regarding the Sixth Amendment and the right to confrontation, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that “[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no
man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”123 The
South Carolina high court found it an “indispensable condition” that “prosecutions be carried on
to the conviction of the accused, by witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his personal
examinations.”124 Neither of these holdings include an addendum that cuts out an exception if the
evidence was created during an ongoing emergency.
It is important to consider that establishing or proving some fact during an emergency,
whether past or present, can be one of the most important times to do so. Officers responding to
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emergencies often must take statements to be fact in order to best respond to an emergency at
hand. If a declarant states that John Doe ran toward the city center with a gun, then that statement
will likely be taken as fact for the purpose of apprehending John Doe for a crime that includes a
firearm. The emergency situation requires that facts be established. This creates a dual purpose
for statements made during emergencies. They may be made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact, but that very establishment of fact may aid law enforcement in both the
resolution of an emergency, but also in the subsequent apprehension and conviction of a culprit
of a crime. The reason that statements of a testimonial nature, considering that they prove or
establish fact, aid in resolving emergencies should not alone be enough to inherently disqualify
those statements from the broader definition of testimonial. Cutting statements with a testimonial
purpose out of the testimonial definition because they are made during an ongoing emergency
creates perverse incentives to maintain a perception of an emergency state whether it exists or
not.125
Inconsistencies and distortion plague the Crawford progeny beginning with Davis,
continuing in Michigan v. Bryant in 2011, and further affecting Ohio v. Clark in 2015. Analysis
reveals that viewpoint shifts, expansions of definitions, and minimizations of core classes occur
in these cases in a manner that severely damages a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation in
all cases, but simultaneously discriminates against victims in domestic violence cases. The
purpose of Crawford was to reestablish order to the system governing the admittance of out-ofcourt statements and to reinvigorate the right to confrontation which the Sixth Amendment
guarantees in all criminal proceedings. Those protections have been worn down through the
lineage of cases following Crawford and consequently, criminal defendants face a system in
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which out-of-court statements offered to prove facts about their behavior or a crime are being
admitted as evidence without any opportunity for the credibility or reliability of the evidence to
be tested through cross examination.
Michigan v. Bryant Fact Pattern
In 2011 the United States Supreme Court handed down another decision which shaped
the jurisprudence covering the Confrontation Clause’s effects on out-of-court hearsay statements
being used as evidence in criminal trials. Michigan v. Bryant was decided by a 6-2 vote and the
opinion was authored by Justice Sotomayor. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg dissented,
and Justice Elena Kagan was not involved in deciding the matter.126 In Michigan v. Bryant, the
victim, Anthony Covington, was shot through the porch door at the home of a man he believed to
be Richard Perry Bryant.127 Twenty-five minutes after the shooting, police were dispatched and
arrived at a gas station where Covington was found, lying in the parking lot, with a gunshot
wound in his abdomen.128 Upon arrival, the police asked Covington “what had happened, who
had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.”129 Covington responded by narrating the
story that he had been shot by “Rick” at approximately three in the morning, that he had been
speaking with “Rick” from the porch and through the back door of Bryant’s home, but when he
turned to leave, he had been shot through the door.130 He then drove to the gas station where he
had been found. Additional officers subsequently arrived at the scene, and each one asked
Covington the same, or similar questions. In all, five separate officers received consistent stories
from Anthony Covington about the crime that had taken place nearly a half hour ago. 131 Between
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five and ten minutes later, emergency medical services approached the scene and moved
Covington to a hospital where he died from his injuries.132 Consequently, Michigan v. Bryant
was a case that tackled the Sixth Amendment from a non-domestic dispute lens and the witness
was unavailable not due to fear or noncooperation, but rather because he was deceased at the
time of Richard Bryant’s trial.
The prosecution in the Bryant case brought the five officers who responded to the scene
to the stand to recount the statements that Covington made to them and narrate how his
statements led to their subsequent actions. They visited Bryant’s home, discovered blood, a
bullet, and a bullet hole in the door, as well as personal belongings and identification of
Covington on the porch.133 Bryant and his lawyers took issue with the prosecution using the
officers as vessels for relaying out-of-court statements made by Covington and argued on appeal
that the admittance of Covington’s responses to the questions of what happened, who shot him,
and where he was shot were a violation of Bryant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him because the statements were testimonial, pursuant to the decisions in
Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington. The case worked its way to the United States
Supreme Court where the Court considered “whether the Confrontation Clause barred the
admission at trial of Covington’s statements to the police.”134 The Court held that “the
circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the
“primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”135 To reach this conclusion, the Court assessed a multitude of situational factors and
adopted a mode of thinking which resembled that of Roberts in a startling way.
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The Expansion of the Ongoing Emergency Doctrine
The Court concluded that the only statements of concern to the Sixth Amendment are
those made with the “primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.”136 Thus, any other purpose for the creation of evidence, including but not limited to
the purposes of resolving an ongoing emergency, would be nontestimonial and admissible in
court without confrontation. These purposes allude to hearsay law which was a cornerstone of
the Roberts logic of reliability. Statements made for the primary purpose of a medical diagnosis
or treatment are not made for trial, but for treatment.137 Other documents may be made for the
purposes of a business records, or for the purposes of furthering a conspiracy. These are all not
proffered for the purposes of serving as out-of-court substitutes for testimony, and therefore the
Court majority argues that these are inherently reliable, and therefore admissible, without
confrontation.138 The Court further expands this primary purpose test by loosely coupling the
ongoing emergency doctrine with the rationale for indoctrinating the hearsay exception for
excited utterances. Namely, when one is distracted by an ongoing emergency, their focus shifts
away from the purpose of proving past events and consequently their desire to fabricate a story
for prosecution is squashed by the desire to project reliable information helpful to ending an
emergency.139 This rationale mirrors the argument for the excited utterance exception—
circumstances of stress, shock, or feelings of excitement eradicate the chances of the declarant
having been in a clear enough mindset to fabricate falsities.140 Some scholars argue that excited
utterances, whether made during an ongoing emergency or not, are never made with a reasonable
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idea that the statement will be used for a prosecutorial purpose.141 These statements as initial
reports are frequently the most reliable and consistent with other physical and circumstantial
evidence.142 This rationale supporting the admissibility of unconfronted statements made by
witnesses during an ongoing emergency stands on the premise that if the circumstances
surrounding a statement indicate that the statement is reliable, then the statement is admissible
without violating the Confrontation Clause. This rationale supports the success of evidencebased prosecution because trusting initial reports and admitting excited utterances as
nontestimonial hearsay broadens the amount of prosecutorial evidence.143 However, admitting
statements for reliability and to guarantee a result favorable for the prosecution is the same
premise which Roberts stood on, and the same premise which was undermined by Crawford in
2004. Bryant returns to the Confrontation Clause to a substantive guarantee instead of a
procedural one as promised in Crawford.144
The Court utilized another viewpoint shift in the Bryant decision, making it clear that it is
the viewpoint of a reasonable participant in the same circumstances that matters when
determining the existence of an ongoing emergency. 145 Would a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position, knowing all of the relevant facts and circumstances which the declarant did,
objectively believe that there was an ongoing emergency, and thus believe that their statements
would be used to address that emergency, and not used for a future prosecution? This is the
question put before the courts when determining whether statements are testimonial. However,
the Court adds that the actual existence of an emergency is of little consequence—if a reasonable
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person in the declarant’s position would be under the impression that there was an emergency,
then their mindset would be affected in the same way as if there actually were an emergency, and
thus, the Court argues, their statements would be reliable and nontestimonial.146 The Court
argues that the existence of a medical emergency would be considered by a reasonable
participant making a conclusion about the existence of an emergency, along with the type of
weapon being used, the formality of the questioning, and the setting of the interrogation i.e.
public or private. 147 Ultimately, the Court declared its decision an establishment of an objective
analysis, but what was actually established presents itself as a multi-faceted consideration that
has so many moving parts that can easily be manipulated by the prosecution to resemble an
emergency and circumnavigate Crawford and the Sixth Amendment. This totality of the
circumstances test is unworkable. The result of Michigan v. Bryant was not a final settlement of
the interim uncertainty caused by Crawford, but rather an effective return to the uncertainties of
Roberts where multi-part balancing tests rule in an unpredictable way.
The steps that the Court took to reach this holding were complicated, and thus the
resulting precedent that the case set is complicated, unpredictable, and dangerous for both
criminal defendants and victims of domestic violence. It creates “an expansive exception to the
Confrontation Clause for violent crimes” and in the same vein effectively exempts victims of
domestic violence from benefitting from this exception.148
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Emergencies— A Product of Uncertainty
The Bryant decision is distinguished from Davis as “a nondomestic, involving a victim
found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose
location was unknown at the time the police located the victim.”149 From these facts, the Court
concluded that the “ongoing emergency” was a potential threat which extended to both the police
and members of the greater public. Thus, the ongoing emergency which the entire decision rests
upon is one of hypothetical future danger made possible by the “nondomestic” nature and setting
in a “public location.” Upon arrival, the responding officers were unaware of Covington’s
identity, unsure of whether the shooting had taken place at the gas station or elsewhere, and
further uncertain of whether the assailant was indeed a continuing threat to either Covington, the
police, or the general public.150 According to the majority opinion, these uncertainties are the
making of an emergency because, until the key facts about the scope of the situation at hand are
established, the primary purpose of the investigators’ questioning is assumed to be to resolve any
emergency that could be happening. Ultimately, the conclusion could be drawn that any situation
where a victim has been injured and the reason for that injury is unknown to the responding law
enforcement is an emergency until sufficient facts are established to show otherwise. What
constitutes sufficient facts is, however, unclear because five separate officers interrogated
Covington, and each of those officers was ruled to have been responding to an ongoing
emergency. Evidently sufficient information to resolve an ongoing emergency is a blurry, but
high bar. The opinion uses the fact that Covington did not make clear through his statements
whether the emergency threat was individual to him or to the public as evidence that it was fair
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for the police to assume that the threat was more broad.151 However, if the primary purpose or
objective of the police was to resolve an ongoing emergency, it seems the quickest way to
resolve such a situation is to determine whether such a situation exists. Hence, rather than asking
questions of a dying man that elicited responses that would have paralleled “a routine direct
examination,” the officers should have asked questions that would have gotten directly to the
heart of the issue—is Bryant a threat to others? Was this an isolated incident? Etc.152 Although
the decision claims that “none of this suggests that an emergency is ongoing in every place or
even just surrounding the victim for the entire time that the perpetrator of a violent crime is on
the loose,” the decision’s evidence in support of this is unclear.153 The Court argues that
interrogations may gradually transform from a response to an emergency to the eliciting of
testimonial statements.
This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police with information
that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an
emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute. It
could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in Davis,
flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public.154
Though this list is likely not all-encompassing, the transformation from a nontestimonial
interrogation to a testimonial interrogation is contingent on a limited number of factors which
suggest that an “ongoing emergency” is to be interpreted broadly. Police can either remain
ignorant to the scope of a situation to extend an emergency and gather statements with a function
identical to those which would be offered in court, or the emergency could extend as long as a
potentially armed perpetrator is a potential threat to the public. The Court creates an exception
with such latitude that conditions can be manipulated into an emergency simply when there are
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uncertainties about the potential scope of a situation and its danger, and this emergency can be
extended by remaining ignorant to clarifying facts. This is not the way that the Confrontation
Clause was intended to function. Consequentially, criminal defendants face a serious injustice in
court when statements with the function of proving past fact pertinent to a crime are not subject
to cross-examination but are entered into evidence because they were made during an ongoing
emergency and construed to have been used to resolve that ongoing emergency. Criminal
defendants suffer from this functional resurrection of Roberts.155
Consequences for Evidence-Based Prosecution and the Hierarchy of Public and Private
Violence
The Bryant decision’s framework has an inadvertently adverse effect on the efficacy of
evidence-based prosecution and thus victims of intimate-partner violence. Consider again the
Court’s language distinguishing Bryant from Davis. Bryant was “a nondomestic dispute” in
which the victim was in a “public location” and the potential threat encompassed “responding
police and the public at large.”156 Later the opinion further distinguishes by noting:
Davis and Hammon involved domestic violence, a known and identified perpetrator, and,
in Hammon, a neutralized threat. Because Davis and Hammon were domestic violence
cases, we focused only on the threat to the victims and assessed the ongoing emergency
from the perspective of whether there was a continuing threat to them.157
Distinguishing the severity of emergencies based on the relationship of the victim and the
perpetrator creates a system where intimate-partner violence is viewed as a lower-risk emergency
than crimes committed by strangers. This diminishes the realities of the severity that intimatepartner violence can reach and disregards the patterns of re-abuse that accompany so many
intimate-partner violence cases. Female victims of intimate-partner violence between the ages of
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18 and 24 were re-abused by the same perpetrator in 77% of cases.158 That statistic jumps to 81%
of females when the age considered is between 35 and 49.159 If the Court was considering the
potential continued threat to the victim at hand, then victims of domestic violence may likely be
facing more of a potential threat than victims of violent crime by strangers or known offenders
who are not intimately related to the victim. A declarant who is not narrating dangerous events as
they happen to a law enforcement officer is not necessarily out of danger. 160
The chance of continued danger to the public, the police, and Anthony Covington was
enough to transform multiple statements made by Covington to police officers in to
nontestimonial statements. However, the likelihood of re-abuse in cases of intimate-partner
violence is insufficient to constitute an ongoing emergency. Even Michelle McCottry noted that
Davis had been “jumpin’ on me again” noting that this was a behavior that had occurred
before.161 The Court also considered the potential threat to additional members of the public in
the Bryant case. However, this was not taken in to consideration when assessing the domestic
violence cases which came before the Court. Intimate-partner violence is not always confined to
one victim. “A study of intimate partner homicides found 20% of victims were family members
or friends of the abused partner, neighbors, persons who intervened, law enforcement responders,
or bystanders.”162 In addition, the threat can often extend to children; between 30 and 60 percent
of intimate-partner abusers also are abusive toward children in the home.163 Intimate partner
violence is not confined to one potential victim. Rather, it both threatens the safety of others and
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often includes re-abuse. Consequentially, the Court’s consideration of whether there was a
continued potential threat to either Michelle McCottry or Amy Hammon may not have
considered all the nuances of intimate-partner violence and the special form of emergency which
it presents. This approach unfairly creates a bias against victims of intimate-partner violence
because the future potential danger to them is not given the same weight as hypothetical danger
to police or the greater public as in Bryant. The Court noted that separating Amy and Hershel
Hammon in to different rooms was enough to end an emergency, yet the separation between
Covington and his attacker both in location and temporally was apparently insufficient.164 This
comparison demonstrates a minimization of the complexities and dangers of domestic violence
and a hierarchy between public and private violence where private violence is a lower tier
danger. The Court went so far as to say that an evolution from testimonial to nontestimonial may
happen if “what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute.”165 This language has
the effect of creating a test where public violent crimes can nearly always be ruled an ongoing
emergency for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, while “private disputes” are never
enough of an emergency to be ruled an ongoing emergency.
However, Oregon has implemented a hearsay law which allows for statements made by
victims of domestic violence within twenty-four hours of an attack to be considered to have been
made in the course of an ongoing emergency and are admissible as long as they bear sufficient
indicia of reliability.166 This law is overcorrects in its response to Crawford. Whether no
domestic dispute, or all domestic disputes are considered ongoing emergencies, the ongoing
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emergency doctrine on its own is incompatible with a fair application of the Confrontation
Clause to cases of ongoing abuse, and lower courts have struggled to apply the doctrine fairly. 167
Though not specifically written out, the Bryant decision adds another relational
requirement to the understanding of the ongoing emergency doctrine. It has the impact of asking
lower courts to consider the relationship between the alleged perpetrator and the victim, and if
the victim and the perpetrator are intimately related, then the scope of the emergency is smaller.
An interesting hypothetical to consider: if Covington had been lying in the same spot at the gas
station with the same fatal wounds, had been asked the same questions about what happened,
who shot, and where, but had answered that it was “Rick,” his husband, who had shot him
through the door of his home about twenty minutes before he had driven to the gas station, would
the opinion have been the same? The only substantive factual difference in this hypothetical
would be the relationship between the victim and the shooter. Suddenly, there is “a narrower
zone of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety” which undermines a great
deal of the Court’s argument for Covington’s statements being offered to resolve an ongoing
emergency.168 The primary purpose test should not place so much weight on the relationship
between the accused and the victim—this creates drastic differences in the amount of protection
of confrontation rights between those accused of domestic violence and those accused of public
violence, and also between victims of public crime and victims of intimate-partner crime. In the
1980s, a series of equal protection cases surrounding law enforcement’s abysmal response to
domestic violence emerged in America’s courts. Plaintiffs claimed that law enforcement treating
victims of domestic violence differently than victims of other violent crime is discriminatory
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against women, and that police should be aware of this negative impact.169 They further argued
that there is no “important or compelling public interest” in different treatment.170 The female
plaintiffs did not win their cases; however, these equal protection cases demonstrate that
discrepancies between treatment of victims of intimate-partner violence and victims of other
violent crime by law enforcement and the court system do raise legitimate questions of whether
an unequal playing field for victims is justified by “important or compelling public interest.”
Clearly, the ruling in Davis regarding McCottry’s statements made during the 911 call
were rendered nontestimonial and thus the bar of ongoing emergency is not a catchall block on
statements made regarding private disputes, but the Court noted that the question before the
Court only required them to assess the testimonial nature of McCottry’s first few responses
during the call. Therefore, they did not assess whether the ongoing emergency did continue after
Davis left the home, and no outer bound of an ongoing emergency was defined by Davis.171
However, considering that the phone call established that Davis had no weapons, the police
could establish that this was a private dispute, and that the police arrived quickly to aid her, if
Davis were decided after Bryant and followed its rationale, I would anticipate that statements
after Davis’s departure would likely be testimonial.
The hierarchy of emergency which minimizes intimate-partner violence has a major
adverse effect on evidence-based prosecution. Evidence-based prosecution is a specific tool
utilized to manage the prosecution of private disputes when the relationship between the victim
and the perpetrator deters the victim from participating and thus are unavailable. Bryant created a
major disadvantage for prosecutors attempting to offer an evidence-based prosecution. Evidence-
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based prosecutors likely have statements made by an unavailable witness that have not been
subject to the opportunity for cross-examination. Therefore, they either need to subject the
statements to that opportunity or prove that the statements were made for the primary purpose of
something other than offering facts for a potential prosecution. The ongoing emergency
exception would be a popular choice for an alternative purpose—however, Bryant makes that
exception much smaller for domestic violence cases than for public violence, and thus evidencebased prosecutors must fight an uphill battle harder than prosecutors of public crimes, or hope
for a judge who is willing to grant a major expansion of Crawford and Davis doctrine. Yet,
activist judges are not the proper solution, either.
I argue that the proper solution is a rebalancing of the Sixth Amendment and Crawford
that does not reprivatize domestic violence, does not over-expand the exceptions to the Sixth
Amendment, nor infringe upon the rights of the accused. Rather, the solution has two parts. The
first part is to implement a new test that shrinks the ongoing emergency exception to equalize
private violence with public violence. The second part is the implementation of communitybased support structures and other policy solutions within jurisdictions. These policies will aid in
improving the efficacy of prosecuting intimate-partner violence by helping victims gain
resources necessary to garner their participation and invigorate forfeiture doctrine for evidencebased prosecutions that must occur because the victim did not participate. My solution would
settle the ambiguity and uncertainty that first manifested in blurry tests of “indicia of reliability,”
evolved into ambiguous conceptions of “testimonial,” and now exist as broad ideas of
“emergency.”172
Ohio v. Clark Fact Pattern and Implications
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In 2015, the Supreme Court handed down another ruling which would shape the
landscape of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Ohio v. Clark’s fact pattern tells a story of
child abuse and answers whether statements made by a three-year-old to his preschool teacher, a
mandatory reporter, about who was responsible for injuring him were testimonial and hence
subject to confrontation. A three-year-old boy, whom the court identified as L.P., arrived at
preschool and one of his teachers noticed that one of his eyes looked bloodshot.173 The teacher
asked the child “what happened,” and he was first non-responsive, but then told her that he had
fallen.174 She noticed that L.P. had red marks covering his face and asked the child, “who did
this?” and “what happened to you?” 175 L.P. responded “something like Dee, Dee,” and told his
teacher that “Dee is big.”176 It was concluded that “Dee” was a reference to Darius Clark, L.P.’s
mother’s boyfriend who was left to care for L.P. and his younger sister while their mother was
away.177 L.P.’s teacher, as a mandatory reporter, alerted the proper authorities about suspected
child abuse. At the end of the school day, Darius Clark arrived at the school to take L.P. home,
denied that he was to blame for the abuse, and left with L.P.178 The following day, L.P. and his
younger sister were taken to the hospital by a social worker; a physician found further injuries
and signs of abuse.179 Consequentially, Clark was indicted for felonious assault, child
endangerment, and domestic violence.180 Ohio law prevented L.P. from testifying—his young
age made him incompetent.181 In lieu of L.P.’s live testimony, the prosecution offered L.P.’s
statements to his teachers at trial under state hearsay law that admitted “reliable hearsay by child
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abuse victims” considering his statements “bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” 182
Clark objected to the admission of L.P.’s statements, arguing that they violated his rights to
Confrontation; the trial court disagreed and Clark appealed his conviction.183 The Supreme Court
ruled that L.P.’s statements were nontestimonial because the situation was an ongoing
emergency considering that L.P. faced the potential danger that the he could be released back to
his abuser at the end of the school day.184Therefore, the primary purpose of the teacher’s
questioning was to respond to this emergency and protect L.P. 185Additionally, the statements
were nontestimonial because the dialogue “was informal and spontaneous.”186 The conversation
between L.P. and his teachers occurred in the preschool lunch room, and only occurred because
the teacher noticed injuries and needed to respond to that emergency. 187 Lastly, these statements
were rendered nontestimonial because L.P.’s young age precluded him from understanding the
criminal justice system well-enough to have the primary purpose of providing a statement with a
prosecutorial purpose.188
The fact pattern of this case differs from the previous cases which shaped the
jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause considering that the statements were not made to
investigating or responding police officers, but rather to a teacher who was a mandatory reporter.
A second key difference is that the statements were made by a three-year-old child whose age
rendered his statements to be regarded quite differently than those of an adult who would better
comprehend the situation. However, despite these differences which do make comparison to
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cases of domestic violence difficult, it is important to discuss this case to better understand the
direction that the Court is taking when determining questions about the Confrontation Clause,
and question what this direction means for evidence-based prosecution and criminal defendants,
both.
First, this case could be read to extend the ongoing emergency doctrine to include the
potential for repeat abuse as a component of an ongoing emergency inquiry. If this were the case,
then evidence-based prosecution of intimate partner violence would be able to go forward with
far fewer issues than they did in the initial time period post- Crawford. However, as a result, the
rights of criminal defendants would be severely damaged, and the Confrontation Clause would
lose strength. Justice Alito, the author of the opinion, wrote:
[The teachers] rightly became worried that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious
violence. Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release L.P. to his
guardian at the end of the day… The teachers’ questions were meant to identify the
abuser in order to protect the victim from future attacks.189
Although not explicit, these words hint at an expansion of the ongoing emergency doctrine to
include repeat abuse, and future attacks. Could Maria’s statements referring to past abuse be
rendered nontestimonial because the 911 operator’s primary purpose in asking whether attacks
on Maria had happened before was to asses Maria’s safety level and protect her from future
attacks? One could follow the line of reasoning in Clark and reasonably come to that conclusion.
However, this would demonstrate a major separation from both Davis and Bryant’s decisions
which all but excluded the possibility of repeat abuse as a contributor to an ongoing emergency.
Clark does, however, mimic Bryant because the rationale behind the decision overexpands the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. I would agree with the Court that L.P.’s age
made him incapable of producing statements with the primary purpose of providing evidence for
189
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trial. If he is legally incompetent to testify in court, then he is likely incompetent to produce
testimony outside of the courtroom. However, this begs the question of whether L.P.’s delicate
age was a necessary or a sufficient condition to render his statements nontestimonial. If his age
was necessary to render his statements nontestimonial, then questions posed to older students by
mandatory reporters could still be testimonial if they have the primary purpose of proving some
past fact relevant to a future prosecution. However, if L.P.’s age was a sufficient condition, as
the opinion hints at by stating that “statements by very young children will rarely, if ever,
implicate the Confrontation Clause,” then it is difficult to discern how much of an effect this
decision has on Confrontation Clause jurisprudence outside the scope of child declarants.190
Despite hinting at L.P.’s age being a necessary condition, the opinion further elaborates
reasons for finding his statements nontestimonial. In Clark, Justice Alito identifies the primary
purpose of the teachers questions as having been “meant to identify the abuser in order to protect
the victim from future attacks.”191 This purpose, worded in this way, nearly exactly replicates a
purpose of offering testimony at trial. At trial, on direct examination, a witness would identify an
abuser or perpetrator of another crime to aid in sentencing and protect the victim or future
potential victims from future attacks. This fine line between a nontestimonial primary purpose
and the purposes of testimony signals trouble for the continuing strength of the Confrontation
Clause. This path is a slippery slope that begins with determining that statements offered to help
end an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial and could potentially end with a Confrontation
Clause exception that encompasses any statement that helps to catch a criminal and fight crime
by providing facts relevant to that crime disguised as a “primary purpose of ending an ongoing
emergency.”
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Resurrecting Roberts
Ohio v. Roberts was struck down by the Supreme Court because its relationship with the
Confrontation Clause was unworkable. The case left out-of-court statements to be handled by
hearsay law instead of the Sixth Amendment and had a nullifying effect on criminal defendants’
rights to confrontation. Crawford v. Washington was handed down as the new rule for
delineating which out-of-court statements were in violation of the Confrontation Clause when
admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination, and which were not. This case created a
major roadblock for prosecutors relying on out-of-court statements made by unavailable
witnesses. Two years following Crawford, the Court readdressed the Confrontation Clause and
testimonial statements and implemented the primary purpose test which allowed for statements
made for the purposes of resolving an ongoing emergency to be rendered nontestimonial and
thus subject to the Rules of Evidence on hearsay instead of to the Confrontation Clause.
Michigan v. Bryant expanded that rule by naming a situation where a perpetrator was unknown
in identity, location, and potential for future threat, and a victim was relaying statements while
suffering from a mortal injury as an ongoing emergency for the sake of the Crawford and Davis
rulings. Finally, Ohio v. Roberts opened the possibility that ongoing emergency doctrine could
encompass situations where future abuse to the same victim. This lineage of cases has excluded
so many statements from being subject to the effects of Crawford and the Confrontation Clause
that “a suspicious mind (or even one that is merely not naïve) might regard this distortion as the
first step in an attempt to smuggle longstanding hearsay exceptions back in to the Confrontation
Clause—in other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts.”192
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Resurrecting Roberts through the gradual restoration of its vitality through a number of
Supreme Court cases is not the direction that the Court should be heading. There must be a
reexamination of the problem that Crawford was initially intended to solve. Crawford sought to
reinvigorate the strength of the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront the
witnesses against them in all criminal prosecutions. The decision determined that holding a
sufficient “indicia of reliability” or falling under “deeply rooted hearsay exceptions” were not
valid reasons to exempt out-of-court statements that served as ex parte evidence from the
Confrontation Clause as a substitute for live testimony. Considering this, the workings of judicial
systems fifteen years after the Crawford decision should still have the same effect of excluding
statements which have not been subject to cross-examinations yet are a “solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”193 The over-expanded
ongoing emergency doctrine has distorted this function and moved Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence to a point where excited utterances are often only subject to the Rules of Evidence
because the “startling event or condition” that the rule requires to be occurring and causing stress
and excitement to be felt by the declarant may be construed to be synonymous with “ongoing
emergency.”194 This virtually returns excited utterances to a point where they are admissible
around the Confrontation Clause because they are a deeply rooted hearsay exception which bears
indicia of reliability—the backbone of Roberts. In addition, Crawford’s original function has
been further distorted by the very text of Ohio v. Clark. A reason which L.P.’s statements are
rendered nontestimonial by the trial court is because the Ohio Rule of Evidence 807 “allows the
admission of reliable hearsay by child abuse victims, the court ruled that L.P.’s statements to his
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teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted as evidence.” 195 Admitting
statements solely because they bear indicia of reliability or guarantees of trustworthiness was the
exact thing Crawford made unacceptable, yet this rationale was being applied in Ohio trial courts
in 2013. This logic demonstrates the reality that the ghost of Roberts is haunting the
effectiveness of Crawford’s impact.
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Chapter 3: Rectifying the Resurrection of Roberts
Function Versus Purpose
Crawford sought to block the admission of statements that were used in lieu of in-court
testimony for the same purposes as in-court testimony by requiring that statements of a
testimonial nature be subject to cross-examination. The right to confrontation is a procedural
guarantee; Crawford makes this clear.196 This means that the test applied in sorting testimonial
statements from nontestimonial statements should keep out those with a function identical to the
function of in-court testimony. Statements made out-of-court during an investigation which
replicate the function of proving some fact pertinent to a criminal prosecution should be subject
to cross-examination. The primary purpose test has blurred the lines between purpose and
function. The Confrontation Clause should have power over out-of-court statements with a
testimonial function because this is a less subjective test than the primary purpose test. Although
purpose and function are often understood as synonyms, their definitions distinguish them
enough to make a major difference when considered from a legal standpoint. According to the
Merriam Webster dictionary, a “purpose” is “something set up as an object or end to be attained;
Intention” 197. The MacMillan dictionary defines it as “the goal that someone wants to achieve,
or that something is intended to achieve.”198 The words intent, wants, and set up, each insinuate
that purpose is dependent on an actor’s desires and motivations. A primary purpose test thus
requires courts to evaluate the mindsets of declarants and the police in a subjective manner. This
is made clear by the aforementioned cases where the primary purposes of the interrogators and
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declarants are assessed. Under this test alone, two identical “solemn declaration(s) or
affirmation(s) made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” against the accused
may be classified differently from one another as long as the declarant’s primary purpose can be
assumed to be different things—one statement for the sake of aiding a prosecution and the other
for the sake of ending an ongoing emergency. Identical statements may have different purposes,
but the same function. Merriam Webster defines function as “the action for which a person or
thing is specifically fitted or used or for which a thing exists.”199 This definition is more
objective—is the action for which the statement is specifically fitted or used an action which
establishes or proves some fact? Is the statement specifically fitted for a replication of in-court
testimony? This assessment requires no speculation into mindset, but rather questions only the
content of the statement. Is the statement the functional equivalent of in-court testimony? Would
the statement, if said during a direct-examination, be right in place? The Confrontation Clause
should cover statements that are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony instead of only
covering statements which have the same purpose of in-court testimony. The oral argument in
the Crawford case suggests that statements functionally equivalent to in-court testimony should
be barred.200This better guarantees that the right to confrontation remains a procedural instead of
a substantive guarantee.
A New Testimonial Test
To cease a resurrection of Roberts and restore order and vigor to the Sixth Amendment in
all criminal prosecutions, and to even the playing field for victims of intimate-partner violence, I
would suggest the implementation of a clear, two-part test that replaces the “totality of the
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circumstances” system offered in Bryant. This test would not even the playing field by
expanding the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause for victims of intimate-partner violence to
match the gaping exception offered to general victims of anonymous violent crime, but rather
scale back the exceptions to become more equitable. Solutions to the problems faced by
evidence-based prosecution should not be solved by growing constitutional exceptions nor a
reincarnation of Roberts, but rather by policy solutions, which will be addressed in this chapter.
The two-part test I suggest does include a primary purpose test, but adds a simple,
objective, second portion to bar statements which would filter through the primary purpose test
despite their testimonial nature. I propose that first, as precedent suggests, the primary purpose of
a statement be assessed. Is the primary purpose of the statement, from the point of view of a
reasonable person in the declarant’s position, to establish facts potentially relevant to a potential
prosecution or criminal investigation? If yes, then the statement is testimonial and should be
subject to the Confrontation Clause without any need to consult the second part of the test. This
falls in line with Davis. If the answer to the primary purpose portion is no, then the court should
consider whether the function of the statements is to prove or establish a fact about a crime that
could be used in lieu of live testimony at a future, or potential trial. If yes, then the statements are
testimonial and should be covered by the Confrontation Clause. If no, then the statement should
be admitted if state or federal hearsay rules of evidence allow. The scope of this test is limited to
statements made to law enforcement officers and individiuals actively working as arms of law
enforcement, like the 911 operator in Davis. The Supreme Court has continually refused to draw
a line on where testimonial statements fall when statements are made to non-law enforcement
officers. Ohio v. Clark failed to do so as well because of the added consideration of L.P.’s
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delicate age. Consequently I, too, will resist to offer a test to determine the testimonial nature of
statements made to non-law enforcement officers.
Figure 1: Flowchart for Two-Part Testimonial Test for Statements Made to Law
Enforcement Officers
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This new test would allow statements which are clearly not being offered for the purposes
of creating evidence for use in a future prosecution to be admitted but would make statements
inadmissible which serve as a functional equivalent of testimony. Sylvia Crawford’s statements,
those regarding her husband’s assault of a man who allegedly attempted to rape her and given
during a recorded interrogation at the police station, would still be testimonial—their primary
purpose was to offer evidence for a prosecution and would not even implicate the second part of
the test. Michelle McCottry’s statements during her 911 call up to the point where the operator
says, “Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started. Stay on the line with me, okay?” would be
nontestimonial because it is clear that McCottry’s primary purpose was to call for help. 201
Usually, victim initiated statements which call for help hold a primary purpose of seeking help,
not to incriminate202 The function of her statements prior to that point do not serve the function
of pointed incrimination of Davis, either. She simply states why she needs help and where she is.
In this context, these statements have the function of being specifically fitted for providing the
operator with the proper information to provide start help. “No “witness” goes into court to
proclaim an emergency and seek help.”203 However, the function of declaring such an emergency
and seeking help was achieved when the operator told Michelle that help was on the way.
Following those statements which called for help, McCottry named the assailant, provided a
narrative of why Davis was at the home, and informed the operator of information such as
Davis’s birthday.204 These statements serve as the functional equivalent of live testimony by
establishing facts relevant to a prosecution. They fail the second portion of the test and are
therefore testimonial. Regarding the statements made by Anthony Covington in Michigan v.
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Bryant, I agree with Justice Scalia’s dissent that “from Covington’s perspective, his statements
had little value except to ensure the arrest and eventual prosecution of Richard Bryant. He knew
the “threatening situation,” (citation omitted) had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier
when he fled from Bryant’s back porch.”205 I would argue that Covington’s statements would fail
to pass the first part of the test and are thus testimonial, but the Court majority disagreed. Under
my test, Covington’s statements would be subject to the second part of the testimonial test and
would fail and be labelled testimonial. “Covington recounted in detail how a past criminal event
began and progressed,” and therefore his statements had the functional equivalent of
testimony.206 The action for which Covington’s statements were specifically fitted was to prove
facts relevant to a criminal prosecution.207
This test would drastically minimize the need for convoluted considerations of the scope
of emergencies. Consider a situation where the scope of an emergency is blurred. There was
disagreement from both Justice Scalia and my point of view about whether the Michigan v.
Bryant fact pattern constituted an emergency. Therefore, Bryant would serve as a good example
for demonstrating how this test minimizes the need for lengthy arguments over what the
boundaries of an emergency are. If you apply my test from the point of view that the situation
was an emergency, then the function test is applied, and Covington’s statements are considered
testimonial because they are particularly suited for in-court testimony. If you say that the Bryant
situation was not an emergency and the primary purpose was to offer facts for criminal
investigation and prosecution, then the statements are rendered testimonial. Both considerations
about the scope of emergency reach the same result, and consequentially courts would no longer
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have to spend time defining emergency with multi-factor and unpredictable tests. My test
resolves this.
Though the test I have offered only applies to statements made to law enforcement
officers and to individuals operating as arms of law enforcement, the test can shed some light on
the fate of statements made to friends and medical examiners, even if not expressly used.
Statements made to friends would most always be nontestimonial because their primary purpose
would not be to prove fact for a potential criminal prosecution, but to confide in a friend or seek
help from a friend. The statements would pass the first prong of the test and likely pass the
second because statements made to friends do not function with the same solemnity as
testimonial statements. Statements made while giving testimony in court function as
incriminating statements given by a declarant to individuals involved in the criminal justice
system. Statements made to friends, while they may function as damning statements, do not hold
the same function of incrimination and are therefore less naturally suited to the function of incourt testimony. Justice Scalia alludes to this in Crawford with, “An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.”208 Statements made during medical examinations would
most always be nontestimonial because their primary purpose would not be to prove past facts
for a potential criminal prosecution, but to provide context to an injury in order to seek proper
treatment. Further, their function differs from testimonial statements. Statements to medical
examiners are well-fitted within examination rooms where there is privacy and function not as
incriminating statements to replace testimony—one would talk to a doctor about their injuries
and conditions different than they would to a judge, jury, and courtroom. However, the narration
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of how an injury was incurred if a medical examiner was referred to examine a victim by law
enforcement following a crime could yield a different result. That would render a situation where
the medical examiner may be operating as an arm of law enforcement and therefore subject to
the scope of my proposed test. This argument is not intended to parse out that situation.
The first portion of this test that maintains the primary purpose test should be considered
from the point of view of the declarant, as perceived by a reasonable person in the declarant’s
position instead of from the interrogator’s point of view. It is the declarant who would take the
stand and understand that they are giving testimony when giving statements in a courtroom. In
the same manner, it should be the declarant whose mindset and primary purpose are considered
to understand whether the declarant-witness would understand that they, though out of court, are
acting as a witness. Additionally, cross-examination is required to assess the reliability of the
mindset of the witness, not the mindset and reliability of the questioning officer. A primary
purpose test which solely focuses on the motives of the declarant helps the court to understand
why statements are made, and thus whether they are understood as solemn declarations proving
some fact.209 Therefore, it is most in line with the Confrontation Clause to assess the testimonial
nature of a statement of the declarant from the point of view of a reasonable person in their
shoes. This test should not be subject to the viewpoint flip-flopping previously employed to
obtain favorable results. In addition, I assess the first question of the test from the point of view
of a reasonable person in the declarant’s shoes because the reasonable person point of view also
allows for statements to be considered from a fresh set of eyes. Prior interactions with the
criminal justice system are common in cases of intimate-partner violence, and these prior
interactions may cause a person to be more aware that their statements are being used for a
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prosecutorial purpose and not to resolve an ongoing emergency210 A reasonable person in the
declarant’s position allows for a neutral, unprejudiced point of view to be considered and makes
the test less subjective than if the viewpoint of the actual declarant were considered.211 The
second part of this test ensures that it is not only the intent of a reasonable person that determines
the testimonial nature of a statement, but guarantees that statements, regardless of intent, are
encompassed by Sixth Amendment protections.
This proposed test shrinks the ongoing emergency doctrine in a manner that levels the
playing field between victims of violent crime by nondomestic offenders and victims of domestic
violence. The test would not allow for statements to be rendered nontestimonial only because the
offender posed a hypothetical threat to the public. Statements made by victims of intimatepartner violence and by victims of nondomestic crime would be treated in an identical manner
because the assessment of the function of statements is less manipulable than assessments of the
purpose of statements. Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent of Bryant that:
If the dastardly police trick a declarant into giving an incriminating statement against a
sympathetic defendant, a court can focus on the police’s intent and declare the statement
testimonial. If the defendant “deserves” to go to jail, then a court can focus on whatever
perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial. And when all else
fails, a court can mix-and-match perspectives to reach its desired outcome.212
The combination of the primary purpose and primary function test strips away the nonsense of
the “totality of the circumstances” approach. The first prong, primary purpose, can immediately
stamp statements made with a prosecutorial purpose with a “testimonial” stamp, but the second
prong, the function test both checks and balances the primary purpose test. It adds an objective
test to assess statements as statements with or without testimonial function instead of as
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statements which can be shaped to circumvent or directly violate the Confrontation Clause
depending on the “fairest” outcome.213 A designation of a purpose to a statement a great deal of
time after a statement was made welcomes manipulation to make the statement more favorable to
admissibility.214 In addition, this discretion allows for discrimination against victims. When a
victim of intimate-partner violence recants or does not fit the bill of what courts and juries expect
a victim to be, then the victim’s statements may be viewed under a different lens. Female victims
of intimate-partner violence have argued that discretion and discrimination go hand-in-hand.215
The difficulties that Crawford posed for prosecutors of evidence-based prosecution is likely to
affect the way that the courts interpret the Sixth Amendment’s coverage, and having a
manipulable test encourages this.216 Assessing the function of statements allows for identical
assertions in different environments to be treated in the same way. For example, if Maria,
Michelle McCottry, and Anthony Covington all responded to a question asking for a physical
description of their assailant by answering that their attacker was a Caucasian male,
approximately six-foot tall and 250 pounds, bald, and wearing a red hoodie, then these identical
statements would yield the same testimonial result. Even if Maria and Michelle identified this
person as their husband or boyfriend and Covington identified him as “Rick” the statements
serve the same function whether the threat extends to one victim, or future potential victims. This
description does not go to resolving an ongoing emergency and has the function of proving a fact
relevant to a criminal prosecution. A descriptive statement such as this would be testimonial
without a subjective assessment of to whom a potential threat extends that has a discriminatory
effect on victims of intimate-partner violence.
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The Need for and Application of a New, Two-Part Test
The primary purpose test combined with a totality of the circumstances assessment made
for an unpredictable, manipulable, and often discriminatory system of sorting testimonial
statements from nontestimonial statements. By the time that Ohio v. Clark was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 2015, the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause had become
over-extended to a point which nearly nullified Crawford and resurrected Roberts. To restore
strength to the Confrontation Clause and Crawford and create a system which does not violate
the rights of criminal defendants nor disadvantage prosecutions of intimate-partner violence, a
new two-part test should be adopted. First, courts should consider the primary purpose of a
statement from the point of view of the declarant. If the primary purpose of the statement is to
aid in a prosecution, it is testimonial. If it is not, courts should assess whether the statement has a
testimonial function. If it does, it is testimonial. Nontestimonial statements are left subject to
evidentiary rules on hearsay. This test equalizes victims of violent crime and removes the
hierarchy that delegitimizes intimate-partner crime. However, it is undeniable that this new test
would not ease the struggles of bringing forward a case by means of evidence-based prosecution
when victims of intimate-partner violence refuse to participate in the prosecutorial process.
Chapter Two has demonstrated that the current tests of the admissibility of out-of-court
statements are unworkable and has presented a solution that does not over-extend exceptions to
allow for evidence-based prosecution to successfully proceed. The solution to the tension
between the Confrontation Clause and evidence-based prosecution is in the legislature, not the
courts. Chapter Four will discuss how community-based support systems, investigative
standards, and the forfeiture doctrine can help to promote the success of evidence-based
prosecution without compromising the Confrontation Clause and equip victims with the
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resources and support they need to be encouraged to take part in prosecution, circumnavigating
the need for evidence-based prosecution altogether.
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Chapter Four: Policy Solutions to the Post-Crawford Crisis
A widened definition of testimonial statements would have negative consequences for
evidence-based prosecution of intimate-partner violence (IPV). Without victim involvement,
most statements gathered through 911 calls and initial police interrogations would not be subject
to cross-examination, and thus, unless the statement were made for a purpose other than to
produce evidence pertinent to a future trial and did not have a function identical to in-court
testimony, most statements made by non-cooperative victims would be inadmissible.
Consequentially, for the prosecution of domestic violence cases to be successful under my
proposed test, several policy solutions should be implemented within criminal justice
jurisdictions. These policy solutions would improve the process of managing intimate-partner
violence cases and hence increase victim willingness to participate in the prosecution, making
evidence-based prosecution less necessary and conflicts with the Confrontation Clause more
infrequent. However, no policy solution will be sufficient to allow or encourage every victim of
intimate-partner violence to be a willing prosecutorial participant, so I will discuss the use of the
forfeiture doctrine in cases where a victim’s participation cannot be secured.
The Need for Community Collaboration
Chapter One discussed several factors which deter victims from participating in
prosecution. If the obstacles that victims face which prevent them from participating in
prosecution could be more easily overcome, then victim-survivors could be more willing to
participate, and the number of evidence-based prosecutions which may have conflicts with the
Confrontation Clause may decrease. Victim needs may be best addressed through a criminal
justice partnership with community organizations that can aid victims in meeting the needs they
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have outside of the criminal justice system.217 The success rate of intimate-partner violence
response may be understood in terms of victim satisfaction with the services and aid made
available to victims by law enforcement including information about restraining orders or
providing transportation to or information about shelter services rather than simply measured by
arrest rates.218 Victims of intimate-partner violence cite a lack of information about the criminal
justice system and about additional services available to them as one of the largest contributing
factors to their unwillingness to participate in the prosecution process.219 Consequently, a
criminal justice partnership with community organizations which provide services and a program
which prioritizes transparency, options, and victim empowerment could improve victim
satisfaction and encourage court participation. Studies dating as far back as 1977 demonstrate
that victim-assistance programs increase victim participation—such programs in LA and Santa
Barbara helped domestic violence non-cooperation rates to be lower than ten percent. 220 In
addition, victims are more willing to participate if time is spent counseling the victim about their
options and their risk.221 Responding police officers are not as well equipped to do this as victim
advocates specifically trained on intimate-partner violence, and thus a criminal justice pairing
with community services can best address the nuances of IPV. Critics of community-criminal
justice conjunctions argue that these partnerships cause intimate-partner violence to become a
subject of social work instead of treated as the violent crime that it is.222 However, these
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partnerships do not require the response to intimate-partner violence to be labeled as either
“social work” or “crime response,” but allow for the unique conditions and complications of IPV
to be understood and addressed. The National Crime Victim Survey uncovered that only one out
of four survey respondents who were victims of domestic violence received services from
victim-assistance programs; the police are often contacted in lieu of help hotlines.223 Intimatepartner violence assistance and resource organizations and the criminal justice system each have
similar goals of protecting victims from violence. This goal could better be achieved if access to
the criminal justice system and victim-assistance worked in partnership so that a call to the
police could be a conduit to additional services when necessary.
The Target Abuser Call Program—An Example of Community Cooperation
The Chicago Target Abuser Call (TAC) program is an example of such a communitycriminal justice partnership which has increased victim participation in domestic violence cases
and should serve as a model for intimate-partner violence response programs which jurisdictions
across the country should adopt. This program is funded through the Violence Against Women
Act’s (VAWA) STOP (Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors) grant224 and additional grant
money from the United States Department of Justice.225 The program utilizes a vertical
prosecution program which employs prosecutors who are specifically trained for TAC
prosecution and partners this domestic violence court with TAC investigators, independent
domestic violence advocates, victim-witness specialists, connecting victims with civil attorneys
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when appropriate.226 Cases are labeled as high-risk based on evaluations of prior criminal
domestic violence history, the severity of injury, presence of weapons or threats of their use, and
evidence of prior threats to kill or harm the victim or his/her family. 227 Once a case has been
“screened in” to the TAC program, an investigative team contacts the victim, calculates her level
of safety, collects evidence and photos, inquires about additional witnesses, and provides the
victim with both a subpoena and written materials about the criminal and civil legal systems, as
well as the TAC program which she will be involved with.228 Next, a victim-witness specialist
places a call to the victim to respond to any questions she may have regarding her options and
the materials she was provided by investigators.229 When the victim arrives on the initial court
date, this specialist will cover court procedure, speak to the victim about her goals for the
process, and aid the victim in filling out an order of protection, if the victim wishes. 230 In
addition, on the first court date, each member of the TAC team, from the prosecutor to the
independent advocate, will speak to the victim about the role they play and the support they can
provide.231 The independent advocate (from the Chicago Hull House) confidentially interviews
the victim to speak about her concerns and address needs regarding housing or shelter, her job,
her children, or counseling through referrals and making contacts.232 TAC advocates made
referrals in 84% of cases—this is a jump of 50 percentage points in comparison to the number of
service referrals made to victims participating with the general domestic violence court. 233
Studies show that greater amounts of tangible support and resources such as childcare,
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transportation, and economic resources aid in increasing the chances that a victim will be
involved in the prosecutorial process.234 Referrals made by the TAC advocates help to give
victims access to these tangible support sources. In addition to receiving support from advocates,
a TAC attorney on the civil side of the law will meet with the victim if she desires or needs
services pertaining to child custody or civil orders of protection.235 Finally, the criminal
prosecutor will speak to the victim about her options for criminal legal remedy, conduct further
investigation, and prepare the victim for trial.236Because the TAC program employs a vertical
approach to prosecution, this attorney will be involved in the victim’s case at every stage and
will subsequently possess greater knowledge about the facts and details regarding each
individual case; this continued support and stability builds trust between the victim and the legal
system.237 Each of the members of this TAC team is then included in regular team consultations
where the desires and needs of the victim are prioritized.238
These procedures were specifically implemented to address some of the primary reasons
that victim-survivors cite for their disinclination to engage with the criminal justice system.
Interviews with victim-survivors of intimate-partner violence show that the confusing criminal
justice process and lack of clarity regarding the differences between the civil and criminal
systems deterred participation, and that victims received insufficient follow-up and contact from
the court system which distorted their understanding of the role they were to play. 239 The
continuity of contact between the victim and members of the TAC team allows for confusion to
be decreased while familiarity with the system to be increased. TAC women reported that the
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involvement of supporters in the TAC system alleviated many of their fears, helped them
become more familiar with the criminal justice system and process, and encouraged them to
continue their involvement in the prosecutorial process. 240 These women reported that the TAC
relationships increased their commitment to the prosecution and this commitment was
empowering.241 In short, the more that the concerns about a lack of information and clarity were
addressed by the TAC team, the more satisfied women were with the prosecutorial process and
the more enthusiastic they were to participate.242
The satisfaction levels of victim-survivors who were screened in to the TAC program
were compared with those of victim-survivors whose cases were addressed in the general
domestic violence court. Overall, TAC participants were more satisfied with the contacts they
had with those involved in the process than the victims who were involved with the general
court.243 The highest satisfaction levels reported by TAC participants were with the court
advocate and with the victim-witness specialist.244 The TAC women expressed that their
questions were better answered, that they believed the TAC team prioritized their needs and
desires, and that they felt they had control within the process; all of these response rates were
more positive than those of the victims in the general court.245 In addition, many more TAC
participants than general court participants reported that they were inclined to come to court
because they believed that they would be protected; this is likely attributed to the greater amount
of support and resources they received prior to the court date.246 More than 75% of responding
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participants reported that their participation in the TAC program decreased the amount of abuse
they experienced.247
The TAC program allows for the victims with the highest need to have easier access to
services and support so that they can better make informed decisions based on the safety of
themselves and their families with less concern for tangible, material needs. TAC would help
guarantee that victims at the highest risk be provided with the services they need to empower and
support them in the criminal justice system and in life in general. When requests for support
services for victims of IPV go unmet, 60% of victims will return to their abuser while 27%
become homeless.248 A community TAC program would put high-risk victims in constant
contact with advocates who can prioritize and address the needs of victims at high-risk and
encourage them to engage with the criminal justice system.
The TAC program is not only successful in increasing communication, transparency, and
access to resources. The program boasts a 90% conviction rate of offenders, with victims
appearing in court 75% of the time—this is in comparison to a 20-30% conviction rate and a
25% appearance rate in general domestic violence courts.249 A victim appearance rate in threequarters of TAC cases is striking and demonstrates that increased efforts to facilitate
participation, fulfill the needs of victims outside of the court system, and clarify the process
make a difference in attrition rates.250 Greater attrition rates translate to fewer Confrontation
Clause conflicts.
The use of a TAC program in every case of intimate-partner violence is unfortunately
impractical considering the additional time these cases require and the insufficient availability of
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funds and resources to support such a large need. However, this problem can best be minimized
by screening into TAC the victims with the greatest chances of re-abuse or intimate-partner
homicide and incorporating the vertical prosecution structure into the model used for all other
IPV cases. Cases should be screened in to TAC utilizing the ODARA (Ontario Domestic Assault
Risk Assessment) test. This test can be quickly administered by responding officers on the scene
of an intimate-partner assault. The questionnaire includes thirteen “yes” or “no” questions; every
question answered with a “yes” receives a score of 1 and “no” receives a zero. 251 When the
questionnaire is complete, the total score is tallied and is compared to a table which predicts the
recidivism rate of cases with such scores.252 For example, scoring a 5 on the ODARA scale
would signal a 53% chance of recidivism while a score of 7 or higher suggests a 73% recidivism
rate.253 An analysis of the ODARA test and similar IPV recidivism prediction tests revealed that
the ODARA was most accurate at predicting future violence; it correctly distinguished recidivists
from nonrecidivists nearly 70% of the time.254 The questionnaire was developed through careful
analysis of criminal justice databases of IPV and utilized the same database to measure re-assault
and common factors within those cases.255 This test asks questions which address the strongest
indicators of re-assault including whether the victim had been confined or restrained from
escape, whether the assailant had ever threatened to harm or kill the victim or her family,
whether the victim is worried about future assault, whether the victim and assailant have children
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together (2 children or more scores a 1), whether the victim has a child with someone other than
the assailant, whether the victim has ever been assaulted during a pregnancy, whether the
perpetrator abuses substances, whether the victim faces barriers to support including lack of
transportation or childcare responsibilities, whether the perpetrator is violent to non-domestic
individuals, whether the perpetrator has prior records of domestic or non-domestic assault in
police reports or on criminal records, whether the assailant has been previously sentenced to
custodial time for more than thirty days, and whether the assailant has ever violated a conditional
release.256 Other risk assessments include questions regarding the presence of or access to
weapons and whether the assailant had ever used or threatened to use such weapons.257 In
addition, more recent studies have suggested replacing the question pertaining to abuse while
pregnant with a question that asks whether the assailant had ever tried or succeeded in strangling
the victim to increase accuracy and sort nonrecidivists from recidivists.258
Responding officers should complete the ODARA form with victims during their
response to the scene, and if the total score is 5 or above, the victim should be included in a TAC
program when resources allow. Approximately 20% of cases result in a score of 5 or above;
when resources do not allow for this number of cases to utilize the TAC system, priority should
be given to cases which score 7 or above which make up approximately 6% of IPV cases. 259 This
test will aid responding officers in assessing the current and future severity of the situation so
that the most tumultuous of situations can receive a proper response and the situations which are
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unlikely to escalate into future abuse can be addressed in a manner which will not aggressively
disrupt the lives of those involved with the full force of the criminal justice system.260 In all cases
which are not screened in to TAC, a vertical prosecution style should be used to promote
continuity and trust between the victim and prosecutor, and a victim witness specialist should
meet with the victim on her court date. Chicago TAC implemented this structure to manage TAC
overflow.261 In addition, all victim-survivors whose ODARA scores suggest that they are at a
higher risk for future violence, a 4 or above, should be provided an opportunity to call an
advocate when police respond to an incident to be notified about safety planning information and
options and receive information about her specific risk factors. 262 Employing a vertical
prosecution system and providing opportunities to connect with prosecutors, victim-witness
specialists, and advocates mimics the strengths of the TAC program without requiring the
extensive use of resources. The use of ODARA to sort cases in and out of the TAC program
allows for cases with high probability of recidivism to be addressed by the prosecutorial system
with the greatest fervor and for cases with fewer indications of severity and chance for recurring
abuse to be managed in a way which supports the victim but is realistic in terms of resources.
Prior Opportunities for Cross-Examination
Criminal justice jurisdictions could further circumnavigate Crawford and Confrontation
Clause issues through policy measures by providing more avenues for prior opportunities for
cross-examinations of witnesses. Cross-examined statements are admissible regardless of
whether the declarant is cooperating at the time of trial. Therefore, testimony given during
pretrial hearings subject to cross-examination and depositions taken with an opportunity for
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cross-examination could be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Crawford and the Sixth
Amendment for the statements contained within the pretrial transcript or deposition. Many states
have held that opportunities for cross-examination at probable cause or preliminary hearings are
acceptable for the purposes of Crawford; the Supreme Court of Colorado, however, has held that
probable cause hearings are not sufficient.263
States including Arizona and Utah have adopted non-waivable preliminary hearings to
allow for an early opportunity for cross-examination.264 In Oregon, a bill is pending which would
allow for the prosecution to call for a hearing to cross-examine a victim if the prosecution is
concerned about the victim making herself unavailable.265The greater the amount of time
between a criminal-abuse incident and the subsequent trial, the greater the chances are that a
victim decides to recant or quit cooperating with prosecutors. 266 Earlier opportunities for crossexamination can diminish the probability of running into a Confrontation Clause issue, minimize
the opportunity for witnesses to be threatened or coerced by batterers, and reduce the need for
victims to be subpoenaed and subsequently held until required to give testimony. 267
In an article titled Domestic Violence and the Confrontation Clause: The Case for a
Prompt Post-Arrest Confrontation Hearing, author Robert Hardaway suggests that immediately
following an arrest for intimate-partner abuse, both the alleged assailant and the victim should be
taken to a specialized courtroom where an immediate cross-examination hearing would be
held.268 A magistrate on-call would preside while a defense-attorney on-call would represent the

263

Moody, Melissa, ‘A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the “Testimonial Statements Test” in Crawford v.
Washington.” William and Mary Journal of Race, Gender and Social Justice 11(3); (2005).
264
Lininger, Tom. p.788.
265
Lininger, Tom. p.791.
266
Lininger, Tom. p.785.
267
Ibid.
268
Hardaway, Robert. p.22-23.

85
accused.269 The prosecutor’s office would be notified, the defendant would be interviewed, and
the victim would appear, make a sworn statement, and be subject to open-ended crossexamination.270 The implementation of such a policy would require a great deal of resources,
time, and commitment; however, it would be a speedy solution to potential Confrontation Clause
conflicts.
Finally, though some states do not allow for victim-witnesses to be deposed during the
pretrial period in criminal cases, studies have shown that victims of intimate-partner violence
find the deposition process to cause less trauma than testifying live. 271 The deposition process
allows for breaks when necessary and allows for the deponent to be exposed to crossexamination without the pomp-and-circumstance of trial.272 Though depositions should not be
exclusively used in lieu of live testimony, the process could be a means of including the victim’s
story in trial, even when they become unavailable, without violating the Confrontation Clause.
Investigative Procedures of Intimate-Partner Violence
In cases where, despite increased support from the community and the justice system, the
victim chooses not to participate, the problems facing evidence-based prosecution can be further
improved upon by the adoption of further procedural tactics for law-enforcement officers to use.
Investigations of intimate-partner abuse should be thorough enough to best allow a prosecutor to
go forward with an evidence-based prosecution without the victim. Arkansas adopted a law
(Arkansas Law Section 12-12-108) which requires that investigative law-enforcement agencies
investigate in a manner that would allow a prosecutor with probable cause to obtain a guilty
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verdict despite a lack of victim testimony. 273 To do so, investigators should properly collect
statements from victims, witnesses, and the offender, obtain medical records, take photos and
collect physical evidence from the scene.274 This can be expanded upon utilizing an example
from Maricopa County, Arizona. The county attorney’s office worked with healthcare forensic
nurse examiners and law enforcement to give victims of intimate-partner violence
comprehensive medical forensic exams; these exams utilized high-definition photos and DNA
collection which helped provide striking evidence of abuse even when victims did not participate
in prosecution.275 These medical exams made strangulation cases easier to prove and helped to
raise the rate of successful prosecution for strangulation in the county from just 14% to 61.5%. 276
These specialized medical examinations, made possible by community partnerships, ensure that
specific signs of abuse are recognized and documented. A study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association uncovered that doctors often fail to recognize signs of abuse in
middle-class patients because of difficulties recognizing abuse and violent behavior in those who
have similar identities or social positions to themselves.277 Partnerships which promote more
specialized and specific examinations ensure that more thorough and specific evidence of
intimate-partner violence is collected. Cases which can be built upon physical evidence instead
of victim testimony will have fewer Confrontation Clause issues.
A stronger focus on collecting evidence in a thorough manner could greatly improve the
success of intimate-partner violence prosecution. A study of police in Rhode Island uncovered
that police collected physical evidence in fewer than 10% of intimate-partner abuse cases and
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conducted interviews with further witnesses in fewer than 25% of cases.278 A study of police in
Ohio revealed that prosecutors were provided with tapes of 911 calls, medical records, and
testimony from eyewitnesses in less than 10% of cases, and prosecutors in North Carolina only
received photos of injuries to victims in approximately 15% of cases.279 This shocking lack of
information given to prosecutors is not a result of a lack of physical evidence or additional
witnesses, but a lack of continuity in the criminal justice system. A study of IPV cases in large
urban areas showed that third-parties witnessed or were aware of incidents in approximately half
of the cases, physical evidence was available in 68%, and victim statements were taken and
preserved in over half of the cases.280 This demonstrates that in a great deal of cases more
evidence is available, but simply needs to be collected thoroughly and passed along. The
statewide adoption of laws similar to Arkansas Law Section 12-12-108 would improve the
process of evidence collection and criminal justice continuity.
Misdemeanor simple assault cases will reap the fewest benefits from procedures which
promote and facilitate the collection of physical evidence and proof of harm to a victim.
Misdemeanor cases often have less physical evidence than more severe instances of intimatepartner violence.281 Without observable injury in simple assault cases, there is little left to
photograph or physically show to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.282 Even so, greater
investigatory thoroughness would have a positive impact on many intimate-partner abuse cases
and allow for a greater number of cases to be tried successfully when the victim chooses not to
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cooperate and the prosecutor faces Confrontation Clause obstacles to trying a case with out-ofcourt statements.
Implementing Giles v. California
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in the case Giles v.
California. In this case, the petitioner, Dwayne Giles, had been convicted of murder after
shooting his ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie.283 The prosecution offered statements made weeks
earlier by the victim to the police when the police responded to a domestic violence call.284 Avie
described to the officers how she and Giles had been involved in a fight. She had been lifted
from the ground and choked, punched, and threatened with a knife.285 She further told the
officers that Giles had made threats to kill her if she was discovered to be cheating on him.286
These statements were admitted under a California hearsay exception for “statements describing
the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to
testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy.” 287 The prosecution offered these
statements at trial to prove that Giles had forfeited his rights to confront these statements (but not
his rights to object to them on hearsay grounds) because, by murdering the declarant, he had
secured the unavailability of the witness. 288 The Supreme Court reviewed the question of
“whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment rights to confront a witness against him
when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to
testify at trial.”289 Ultimately, the majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia concluded that the
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forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was in use at
the time of the founding and therefore a legitimate exception, but it was only applicable when the
actions by the defendant were designed to make the witness unavailable to testify against the
defendant.290 The opinion ultimately concluded that Giles’ actions were not taken to procure
Avie’s unavailability for his murder trial, so the forfeiture doctrine did not apply in the Giles
case but is a valid consideration for many cases, including intimate-partner violence cases. The
opinion concluded with a caveat for the domestic-violence context:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to
outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate
the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a
criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture
doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting
to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing
criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify. 291
This paragraph signals that the forfeiture doctrine is an exceptionally important tool for
promoting the success of evidence-based prosecution. Intimate-partner violence situations give
criminal defendants a special relationship with their victim-witness which can make coercive
behavior and threats of violence to deter the victim from testifying especially persuasive.
All fifty states have adopted some form codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine into state rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence include a forfeiture
provision under Rule 804(b)(6). The rule allows that any “statement offered against a party that
wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a
witness, and did so intending that result” be admitted as evidence.292 Of course, this is only
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applicable if a judge has first determined that the defendant had taken specific actions designed
to ensure the unavailability of the victim-witness and had therefore forfeited Confrontation
Clause objections to the admittance of statements by that witness. This hearsay rule is positive
considering that the shift from a Roberts framework to a Crawford framework made threats to
the victim which resulted in victim noncooperation beneficial and worthwhile for the
defendant.293 Under Roberts, the defendant could still be convicted using out-of -court
statements, while under Crawford, without a codified forfeiture exception, securing the victim’s
unavailability could secure a dropped case. A Crawford framework coupled with a codified
forfeiture doctrine allows for the right to Confrontation to be better protected than it was when
Roberts was the law of the land but ensures that criminal defendants do not benefit from securing
the unavailability of victim-witnesses through threats, coercion, or bribes.
A successful case proving forfeiture by wrongdoing could be one of the most effective
means of securing a conviction in evidence-based prosecution. If it can be proven that the
defendant purposefully took actions to dissuade the victim-witness from being available for live
testimony, then unconfronted statements made by the unavailable victim-witness could be used
in trial to build a successful intimate-partner violence case. First, forfeiture is primarily a
preliminary issue determined by a judge prior to trial.294 Consequently, the judge can determine
forfeiture by hearing statements which would otherwise be inadmissible without forfeiture
having been confirmed.295 Because forfeiture is a preliminary matter, it should be proven to a
judge at a pretrial hearing when otherwise inadmissible evidence can be utilized under rule
104(a) in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This rule requires that “the court must decide any
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preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is
admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on
privilege.”296 This means that the judge can hear evidence such as jailhouse calls and 911 calls
which are hearsay to determine forfeiture. If this otherwise inadmissible evidence proves a
forfeiture case, then the same evidence will be subject to rules of evidence. For example, if a 911
call is used to prove forfeiture to a judge then the same phone call could still be rendered
inadmissible if does not meet the specific requirement of the forfeiture hearsay exception,
namely it is a testimonial statement but not necessarily a statement against the defendant.
Statements like this would only be admissible if they met the requirements of another hearsay
exception. The judge would also have the authority to make statements inadmissible under rule
403 of the Rules of Evidence if the statement is rendered to be more prejudicial than it is
probative.297 Even if the judge examines evidence for a forfeiture ruling and believes it credible
for a ruling affirmative of forfeiture, the judge may still render it inadmissible for trial under
another evidentiary rule. An affirmative forfeiture ruling would not make all evidence
immediately admissible, but it removes the Confrontation Clause obstacle, so evidence is only
subject to the Rules of Evidence. If this evidence does not prove forfeiture, then the testimonial
evidence is inadmissible if the declarant is unavailable. The procedure for determining forfeiture
does not employ circular reasoning because first, a judge determines the preliminary matter of
forfeiture while a jury determines guilt. Second, the standard of proof for a preliminary matter on
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forfeiture, a preponderance of the evidence, is lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard of proof for guilt.
Despite Giles being a lethal case, forfeiture is not limited to lethal cases. The Supreme
Court said that forfeiture applies when “the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent
the witness from testifying.”298 This conduct is not limited to murder and is in fact “need not
consist of a criminal act.”299 Considering this, the expanse of forfeiture extends over non-lethal
domestic violence cases when it can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence—a standard
much lower than that for criminal convictions—that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing,
criminal or not, which caused the declarant-witness to become unavailable for trial.300 Courts
have historically held that forfeiture applies even when the misconduct is not murder or the
acquisition of one’s murder in cases like United States v. Aguiar, United States v. Potamitis, and
numerous others.301 Giles only specifically addressed situations where actions culminate in
murder, but did not close the door on forfeiture for non-lethal cases and the Rules of Evidence
make clear that murder is not a prerequisite for forfeiture.
Regardless of whether the case of intimate-partner violence is lethal, there are numerous
sources of evidence and procedures which can be used to build a strong case of forfeiture. Calls
from jail with statements made by the victim-witness, which unless forfeiture is proven, could be
ruled inadmissible at trial could be played to the judge to prove that the defendant was coercive
and made threats to the victim-witness and also show the reaction of the victim-witness to these
tactics. Seventy-five percent of the time, victim-witness women cease to be cooperative after
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speaking with the abusive defendant in intimate-partner violence cases.302 One survey
demonstrated that ninety percent of jurisdictions which were surveyed released a majority of the
defendants in domestic violence cases while awaiting trial, which gives defendants a larger
opportunity to contact and dissuade the victim-witness from cooperating.303 A study from
Milwaukee discovered that more than half of defendants in intimate-partner violence cases
contacted their victims prior to the trial date and made efforts to convince the victim to recant,
change their story, or cease cooperation.304 Evidence of these such conversations or actions
should be sought after and used to prove forfeiture. This requires support of, and contact with,
the victim-witness for as long as possible.
Responding police officers could ask questions which would supplement a forfeiture
claim. Questions about whether the accused had ever threatened the witness if she called the
police or cooperated with authorities should be asked.305 Further, questions such as, “How
frequently and seriously does your partner intimidate you?” “Have you ever made it known to
your partner that you wanted to leave?” and “If so, how did your partner react?” would help to
draw out a narrative about intimidation and threatening responses that plant fear in the victimwitness.306 Written evidence such as texts, posts on social media, and voicemail recordings could
also potentially be used to show a pattern of manipulation or isolation.307 Any evidence
preemptively gathered to demonstrate trauma and fear experienced by the victim that could
potentially later be connected to actions taken by the defendant with, among other motivations, a
302
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motivation to prevent the victim from testifying against the defendant would be relevant to a case
of forfeiture. This type of evidence should be collected and could be used to secure a ruling of
forfeiture by wrongdoing and serve to aid in successful evidence-based prosecution.
Corroborating evidence helps to paint a bigger picture of abuse which can protect both victims
and criminal defendants. For example, corroborating evidence collected by investigators helps to
build a stronger case for forfeiture and allows for a story to be told about the infliction of trauma
and the buildup of fear within a victim which are relevant to questions of forfeiture to aid in
prosecution. Additionally, corroborating evidence helps to mitigate fears of false-positives in
intimate-partner violence cases. This evidence in conjunction with testimonial accusations of
harm and abuse helps shed light on the reliability of such accusations. Forfeiture is an important
determination with the power to suspend the rights of the accused. Therefore, it is imperative that
forfeiture cases not be built solely upon accusations that could be false-positives. Investigators
need to make every effort to secure corroborating evidence, and the cases that prosecutors make
for forfeiture should be robust enough to best mitigate the chance for false positives. The
solution to concerns about falsely positive accusations should not be a suspension of the use of
forfeiture, but rather a respect for the integrity and importance of forfeiture. Judges making
determinations about forfeiture should consider and weigh the evidence and ensure that if there is
a preponderance of evidence suggesting that the defendant has forfeited their rights, that there is
sufficient evidence suggesting that the ruling is not based upon a false positive. Corroborating
evidence supplied through thorough investigation is therefore imperative.
In a case from New York, People v. Byrd, prosecutors had proven forfeiture by
wrongdoing at an evidentiary hearing using expert testimony to describe non-violent actions
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characteristic of abuse as they relate to Battered Women’s Syndrome. 308 The expert witness
testimony proved that the victim suffered from the trauma of Battered Women’s Syndrome.309
The expert witness further elaborated on the effects of the “honeymoon” stage of abuse where
apologies and promises made through calls and visits can be made for the purpose of convincing
the victim to not cooperate with prosecutors.310 Forfeiture was proven in the Byrd case. The
timeline of such actions is important because the phone calls and visits in Byrd were made after
charges for abuse had been made so the promises and actions within the honeymoon phase were
designed with the specific intent to persuade the victim’s unavailability in a different sense than
had the “honeymoon” phase taken place absent of criminal charges. 311 Battered Women’s
Syndrome and past experiences of coercion and control are only sufficient to prove that the
defendant may have engaged in wrongful acts which caused trauma. The additional component
of specific acts taken designed to procure unavailability for trial would be necessary following
police intervention and charges. Past evidence is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for forfeiture. In this way, less serious efforts to intimidate victims, alone, would be
insufficient to suspend confrontation rules, but these efforts, when criminal charges are pending
or on the table, coupled with additional evidence would be enough for a forfeiture ruling.
Consequently, forfeiture is possible without specific threats of murder, but proving forfeiture can
be an uphill battle dependent on temporal considerations of when specific threats and coercive
“honeymoon” behaviors are employed by the defendant.
The forfeiture doctrine would be inapplicable when the victim-witness refuses to testify
for reasons not resulting from specifically designed deterrent conduct by the defendant. The
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forfeiture doctrine would not cover cases where victims become non-cooperative due to a desire
to drop the case because of financial concerns, concerns for children, or other legitimate reasons
separate from the defendant’s wrongdoing. Proving wrongdoing requires continuity and temporal
proof of wrongful action by the defendant specifically designed to secure the unavailability of
the witness. Therefore, if a victim-witness decides to drop the case and there is no evidence or
suggestion that wrongful actions were taken by the defendant in response to criminal justice
intervention, then the case for forfeiture would be lacking the intent requirement made clear in
Giles. Actions and intent must be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. In cases
where victim non-cooperation is the result of a factor other than wrongdoing intended to secure
unavailability, there will likely be too little evidence of such action and intent to constitute a
preponderance. In cases such as this, the criminal justice system may not be the proper avenue
for help at that particular time, and referrals for services and support from community support
systems may be more beneficial than a life-disrupting prosecution process.
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Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions
The relationship between intimate-partners who experience violence is complicated, and
consequently the history and practice surrounding the prosecution of such cases of violence is
complicated. For many years, Ohio v. Roberts dictated the procedure for prosecuting cases,
including IPV cases, in which victims or other witnesses were unavailable. Under this
framework, statements made by unavailable witnesses were being admitted without crossexamination regardless of their testimonial nature and despite the confrontation guarantee
afforded by the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment. In 2004, Crawford v. Washington was handed
down by the United States Supreme Court and mandated that testimonial hearsay statements are
inadmissible when the witness is unavailable for trial and there is no opportunity for the
statements to be subject to the procedural guarantee of cross-examination. This decision initially
served as a major barrier for prosecutors working with evidence-based prosecution of intimatepartner violence. However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions including Davis v. Washington
and Michigan v. Bryant have weakened the effects of Crawford and done so in a way which
dichotomizes “public” and “private” violence and places public violence on a heightened level of
urgency and concern. Under the present system, Roberts has been figuratively resurrected, the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not operate with full force, and victims of intimatepartner violence and evidence-based prosecution of IPV are subject to different treatment than
the victims and prosecution of public crimes. In order to restore the vigor of the Sixth
Amendment, rectify the resurrection of Roberts, and create a fair path forward for IPV victims
and evidence-based prosecution, a new two-part testimonial test which assesses the purpose and
function of statements should be adopted in courts, and policy initiatives should be adopted to
aid and protect IPV victims. Steps must be taken at every level to ensure that both the rights of
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the accused and the rights of victims to be heard and be safe are protected. The adoption of
programs, such as TAC and vertical prosecution, would help to promote victim involvement and
their voice while minimizing Sixth Amendment issues. Further, jurisdictions should make efforts
to facilitate early opportunities for cross-examination of victim-witnesses. Where, still, the
availability of victim-witnesses cannot be secured nor prior cross-examination opportunities be
managed, evidence-based prosecution should robustly go forward when the safety of victims and
society is dependent on prosecution. In order to do so without overwhelming Sixth Amendment
obstacles, law enforcement investigators should be required to collect physical and spoken
evidence in such a way that would best support an evidence-based prosecution. Finally, evidence
should be collected and used to prove forfeiture by wrongdoing pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
2008 ruling in Giles v. California. In doing so, criminal defendants cannot perpetuate the cycle
of abuse by benefiting from coercing, threatening, or further harming victim-witnesses.
The story of confrontation clause jurisprudence from Roberts to present is one of a tugof-war between a strengthened Sixth Amendment and strengthened prosecutions. While Roberts
ruled, unavailable witnesses were not detrimental to a successful prosecution. While Crawford
controlled the courts, prosecutors with hearsay statements made by unavailable witnesses
struggled to move forward with prosecution, and in response Davis, Bryant, and Clark gradually
dulled the force of Crawford and returned to a system which resembles the Roberts, diminished
Sixth Amendment, framework. I proposed a new two-part test to pull the rope back toward the
center between the Sixth Amendment and strengthened prosecution. However, the solution to the
confrontation clause conflict does not fall solely to the judicial system. Rather, the solution is a
marriage of public policy and law. My proposed two-part testimonial test would settle the
testimonial issue for the courts and the implementation of public policy initiatives would settle
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further difficulties for evidence-based prosecution and best support victims of intimate-partner
violence. The resurrection of Roberts can be rectified, but doing so requires a healthy, intimate
relationship between public policy and law.
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